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Radioactive Waste and Euratom: Towards
a More Effective Regime of Regulation
By SAMUEL B. ANGUS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The accident at Chernobyl' and the troubled efforts of the United
States to establish radioactive waste disposal sites' have focused world
attention on the complexities of managing radioactive waste. Radioac-
tive waste is an exceptional risk because its extreme toxicity3 can last for
thousands of years.' Yet, despite this risk and the stockpiling of radioac-
tive waste at nuclear power plants, 5 it is likely that nuclear power will
supply an increasing amount of the world's energy needs.6
Radioactive waste poses a special problem to the countries of the
* B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1990. The author wishes to thank his
wonderful wife, Maria, for her thoughtful assistance and unselfish support.
1. See Jillian Barron, Note, After Chernobyk Liabilityfor NuclearAccidents Under Inter-
national Law, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647 (1987). See also Michael Dobbs, Chernobyl
Rekindles Debate on Nuclear Power, But Only in West, WASH. POST, May 5, 1986, at A22-
For a description of the Chernobyl accident, see infra note 67.
2. See Jeffery D. Raeber, Comment, Federal Nuclear Waste Policy as Defined by the
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 111 (1989).
3. Radiation poses a cancer risk depending on the degree and type of exposure. Charles
H. Montange, Federal Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309, 315-16
(1987). Plutonium is lethal when inhaled or swallowed in microscopic amounts. Thomas W.
Lippman, Disarmament's Fallout: 50 Tons of Plutonium May Require Disposal, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 1991, at Al.
4. Radiation of spent nuclear fuel does not diminish to safe levels for at least 500 to 1,000
years. Montange, supra note 3, at 377. Plutonium, a manmade element used in nuclear war-
heads, has a half-life of 24,000 years. Lippman, supra note 3, at Al.
5. Karen DeYoung, Massive Nuclear Site Disturbs Britons, WASH. POST, May 19, 1986,
at Al. See also Marshall Yates, Questions Surround DOE's Program to Process High.level
Radioactive Waste While Serious Problems Found With Low-level Waste, Puri. UTItL FORT.,
Jan. 18, 1990, at 52.
6. President Bush's budget recommendations for fiscal year 1992 included a 47% in-
crease over the administration's 1991 budget for nuclear energy production. Lori M. Rodgers,
Congress Receives President's Budget, PUBL UTIL FORT., Mar. 15, 1991, at 37. The European
Community (E.C.) projects that by 1995 the proportion of electricity produced by nuclear fuel
for E.C. consumption will increase to 38%, up from just 8% in 1973. Energy, EUR. UPDATE,
Oct. 11, 1991, available in WESTLAW, EurUpdate Database, 1990 WL 259685, § 2.1.1. See
also Thomas W. Lippman, Is Nuclear Power Blooming Again?, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1991, at
Hl. Additionally, the dismantling of nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War will
add to the growing volume of nuclear waste requiring disposal. Lippman, supra note 3, at Al.
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European Community (E.C.). The E.C. lacks vast unpopulated territo-
ries suitable for radioactive waste disposal. Unlike the United States' rel-
ative isolation, the physical proximity of the European countries to each
other requires an increased cooperation in the production and disposal of
radioactive waste. Europe is committed to nuclear power. It has become
one of the world's largest producers of nuclear energy. With the 1992
unification of the E.C., nuclear energy output will increase, resulting in
increased production of radioactive waste.7
Among the countries of the E.C., policy and control of nuclear
waste is governed by the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom)A Although subject to constraints under the
Treaty, each Member-state retains significant control over its radioactive
waste policy.9 Consequently, radioactive waste regulation operates in an
ad-hoc and uncoordinated manner on the Community level. Regionally,
severe problems have emerged concerning radioactive waste disposal.
These problems range from direct contamination of Member-states and
third-party countries' environments, to ineffectual tracking of radioactive
waste transport within the E.C., to inadequate responses to emergency
situations.
This Note will initially summarize the basic characteristics of radio-
active waste. A distinction will be drawn between the different types of
radioactive wastes, and their respective production and disposal
problems. This discussion will also describe nuclear energy production
and radioactive waste disposal within the E.C. What emerges is a picture
of a region where a wide range of nuclear energy and waste disposal prac-
tices exists with little central oversight. As a result, severe problems in
disposal of radioactive waste have occurred. Next, the basic structure
and workings of the Euratom Treaty will be outlined. This discussion
will include a brief overview of events which influenced the Treaty's
adoption, its original mission, and its institutional and legal foundations.
The capacity of Euratom to effectively regulate radioactive waste
disposal will then be analyzed. Specifically, the efficacy of Chapter III
(relating to Health and Safety) and Chapter VII (relating to Safeguards)
will be explored. What is found is a Treaty that is ill equipped, legally, to
govern the current radioactive waste disposal dilemma in the E.C. By
leaving principal authority over radioactive waste disposal to individual
7. Rodgers, supra note 6, at 37; Energy, supra note 6, § 2.1.1.; Lippman, supra note 6, at
HI.
8. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [hereinafter
EURATOM TREATY].
9. ALAN CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW 741-42 (1973).
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Member-states, Euratom fails to advance effective regional oversight. It
is this lack of an effective regional regulatory mechanism which allows
individual Member-states to disregard the interests of other Member-
states and the Community at large. In conclusion, this Note suggests
specific modifications to existing Treaty provisions in order to centralize
authority to govern radioactive waste disposal in the Community.
H. RADIOACTIVE WASTE: THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM
A. The Problem of Radioactive Waste
In a fundamental sense the unique quality of radioactive ° waste cre-
ates the need for a legal mechanism to manage its disposal. To fully
understand the extent of Euratom's ability to address the problem of nu-
clear waste disposal in the E.C a basic knowledge of radioactive waste is
necessary.
Almost all modern industrialized nations generate some type of ra-
dioactive waste. Radioactive waste originates from a variety of activities
and takes a number of different forms. A broad range of enterprises,
from production of nuclear fuel and generation of electricity to research
and medical applications, produce radioactive waste. 1 Generally, radio-
active wastes are classified into three categories: Low-Level Waste
(LLW), Intermediate-Level Waste (ILW) and High-Level Waste
(HLW). The classification that a radioactive waste compound receives
depends on the intensity and longevity of its radioactivity.' 2
Radioactive LLW contains an insignificant amount of long-lived ra-
dionuclides,' 3 but may have a radiation level high enough to necessitate
10. For purposes of this Note, waste which is radioactive is referred to as either "radioac-
tive" or "nuclear" waste. Generally, such waste is defined as that which is created and regu-
lated by man and which enhances natural background radiation exposure. This definition does
not encompass naturally occurring radioactive materials which may, however, be deserving of
regulation because of high radiation content. See Montange, supra note 3, at 312-15.
11. Id. at 312-13. See also J.L. Zhu & C.Y. Chan, Radioactive Waste Management: World
Overview, 31 Q. J. INT'L ATOM. ENERGY 5 (1989).
12. Radioactivity is the process in which the nucleus of an atom "decays" by releasing
alpha particles (helium nuclei composed of two protons and two neutrons), beta particles (elec-
trons), or gamma rays (resembling x-rays). Montange, supra note 3, at 312 n.7.
13. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 6. "Short lived" and "long lived" waste refer to a
given radioactive element's half-life. An element's half-life refers to the time it takes for any
given radionuclide to lose half of its radioactivity. For example, caesium-137 has a half-life of
about 30 years, while natural uranium has a half-life of approximately 4,500 million years.
Radioactive elements with half-lives longer than 30 years are generally considered long-lived.
Id.
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shielding in handling.14 LLW comes from a variety of sources, but hos-
pital and research activities constitute its primary origins. Typically,
LLW includes such items as contaminated gloves, rags, glass, small tools,
paper, and filters.15 LLW comes in gas, liquid, or solid form.
Contrary to what its name may suggest, LLW can still be a signifi-
cant health-hazard. For example, some LLW may emit intense amounts
of radiation, but due to the short half-lives of the elements involved,
these emissions may approach background levels of radiation rapidly. 16
Other waste classified as LLW may emit relatively low levels of radia-
tion, yet may continue to do so into perpetuity.'"
For disposal purposes, liquid and gaseous LLW is treated, diluted,
or held for radioactive decay and then released into the environment. 8
With solid LLW (including sludge and solidified liquids) the common
method of disposal is burial in shallow trenches.19 Further, some coun-
tries have dumped LLW into the marine environment.20
As a general matter, LLW disposal strategies allow for disbursion or
dilution of the waste into the environment. This significantly distin-
guishes LLW from other types of radioactive waste (e.g. HLW), which
must be permanently isolated from the environment.
The second category of radioactive waste, ILW, contains lower
levels of radioactivity and heat than HLW, but still requires shielding
during handling. Such waste typically includes resins or solidified chemi-
cal sludges as well as equipment or metal fragments from nuclear power
reactors. 21 Despite its increased radioactivity, in most countries ILW is
disposed by means similar to that employed in the disposal of LLW,
14. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NUCLEAR WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT AND THE USE OF THE SEA 13-14 (1984).
15. Zhu & Han, supra note 11, at 6.
16. Montange, supra note 3, at 358. Many medical related wastes are of this quality. Id
17. Id. An example is plutonium-239. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 12. Under the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (known as the London Dumping
Convention), signed in 1972, the parties agreed to a non-binding moratorium on sea dumping
of radioactive wastes. Id. See also Robert A. Kaplan, Comment, Into the Abyss: International
Regulation of Subseabed Nuclear Waste Disposal, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 769, 772 (1991).
Although strong international resistance to ocean dumping of LLW continues to prevail, sev-
eral nations have resumed ocean dumping of such waste. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON
OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 31. On September 22, 1992, 15 European coun-
tries, including every E.C. Member-state except Italy and Greece, agreed to a 15 year ban on
ocean dumping of LLW and ILW. Frances Kerry, European States Agree To Ban Radioactive
Dumping, REUTER EUR. COMM. REP., Sept. 23, 1992.
21. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 6.
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namely surface holding structures or shallow burial trenches. Some
countries have built or are planning to build shallow underground reposi-
tories for ILW waste.22
It is HLW which is the most incompatible with, and therefore repre-
sents the greatest risk to, the human environment. HLW consists pri-
marily of spent nuclear fuel.23 It can also be comprised of radioactive
material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.2" HLW
can take the form of a liquid, solid or gas waste product 25 Due to the
extreme toxicity and longevity of its radioactivity, HLW must be isolated
from the environment for thousands of years when disposed. 26  Cur-
rently, the technology for permanent storage of HLW does not exist.
Most countries with nuclear power programs are in the process of devel-
oping deep geological disposal facilities called "repositories." 27 While
22. Id. For example, both France and the United Kingdom dispose of ILW through bur-
ial in shallow trenches. Germany and Belgium utilize repositories for their disposal of ILW.
Some ILW is treated through the use of chemical processes to solidify and reduce its volume.
Id at 8.
23. Spent nuclear fuel is the intensely radioactive material withdrawn from the core of a
nuclear reactor following irradiation but prior to reprocessing. Exposure to radiation from
spent nuclear fuel, even briefly, can be lethal. Such material is thermally hot due to intense
radioactive decay. Moreover, it can remain extremely hazardous to handle for thousands of
years. Montange, supra note 3, at 376.
24. Spent nuclear fuel is sometimes reprocessed in order to extract uranium and pluto-
nium for re-use as reactor fuel. The remaining waste by-product is highly radioactive and may
be in either a liquid or solid form. Such high-level waste product remains lethal for centuries.
1, Transuranic wastes are considered HLW. These consist of wastes contaminated with plu-
tonium material and arise primarily from the reprocessing of fuel and the fabrication of pluto-
nium weapons. NAT'L ADVIsoRY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at
13.
25. Some HLW is immobilized into a glass-like substance in a process termed "vitrifica-
tion." The purpose of this process is to condense and solidify waste for disposal. V. M.
Efremenkov, Radioactive Waste Management at Nuclear Power Plants, 31 Q. . INr'L ATOM.
ENERGY 37, 37 (1989). See also Yates, supra note 5, at 52.
26. Gorden Linsley & Ivan Vovk, Safety StandardsforHigh-level Waste Disposal, 31 Q. J.
INT'L ATOM. ENERGY 26, 26 (1989). This is due to the intense and enduring toxic effects of
this type of radioactive waste. Because of the longevity of HLW, any storage-disposal system
must be designed to last until "it can no longer be assumed that the repository will be under
any form of control by man." Id. It should be noted that the "permanent isolation" require-
ment of HLW is quite distinct from the "disbursing-dilution" strategy employed in the dispo-
sal of LLW and some ILW.
27. Currently, deep geological disposal is considered to be the most effective way to man-
age HLW. This is because it offers the best chance at essentially permanent isolation of the
waste from the environment. Id The basic objective of deep repository disposal is to provide
multiple barriers (both human-made and geological) to assure that the waste will remain im-
mobilized and isolated while radioactive decay reduces radioactivity to negligible levels. Zhu
& Chan, supra note 11, at 11. The most likely mechanism causing the release of radionuclides
from a repository is believed to be the ingress of ground water. For this reason, repository
selection and construction focuses on isolating the waste from contact with water. This is
1993]
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development of these "permanent" repositories is undertaken, 28 used nu-
clear fuel is stored at nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants in pools
filled with water.2 9 However, because the expansion of nuclear energy
production has continued without a permanent solution to the problems
of HLW disposal, many power and reprocessing plants are facing serious
storage problems.3°
While technological solutions to the disposal and storage of LLW
and most ILW do exist, long-term management of HLW is still uncer-
tain. Still, LLW and ILW pose significant risks to the environment if
their disposal is not carefully managed."1
The physical properties of radioactive waste make it unique from
other types of waste. Not only is radiation emitted ftom such waste in-
visible and undetectable without special equipment, but it represents
some of the most harmful substances known to humankind.32 Moreover,
customarily achieved by locating a repository in a site with very little water presence (c.g, salt
and anhydrite deposits) and by constructing natural and human-made barriers to water in.
gress. Alf Larsson, State-of-the-Art Report on Radioactive Waste Disposal, 31 Q. J. INT'L
ATOM. ENERGY 18, 20 (1989). Under the London Dumping Convention, ocean disposal of
HLW is prohibited. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14,
at 42. Note that a repository for LLW and ILW is materially different than a repository for
HLW (which has yet to be developed by any country).
28. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be no per-
manent storage site for HLW in Europe before the year 2000. Larsson, supra note 27, at 25.
In the United States the estimate for the opening of a permanent repository has been pushed
back to 2010. See Yates, supra note 5, at 52. One reason for the delay is that any repository
must not only be "engineered" perfectly to contain its waste contents, but it must also be
located in geological formations which will remain undisturbed for thousands of years. Id.
Finding an adequate location requires years of studies and models to predict a site's stability
over the course of centuries.
29. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 11. Some countries with nuclear power capacity return
spent fuel to a foreign supplier to be reprocessed. Id.
30. Id. Because of limited storage space at various reactor and reprocessing sites, some
countries are building centralized "away from reactor" storage centers to house spent fuel
prior to long-term repository disposal. Id. How long spent fuel remains at reactors and
reprocessing centers or centralized storage centers depends upon individual national policies.
Typically, HLW and spent fuel are stored between 20 and 50 years prior to long-term disposal.
Id.
31. Since dispersion into the environment is considered a viable disposal option with
LLW and ILW, when concentrations of these wastes become too high the potential for harm is
great. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text. An example is the continued dumping of
significant amounts of LLW effluents by the United Kingdom's Sellafield reprocessing plant
into the Irish Sea. The radioactive level of this body of water is nearly 10,000 times the normal
background levels. Irish and Swedish fisherman have caught radioactive fish in the area. Dc-
Young, supra note 5, at Al.
32. Ionizing radiation injures humans by causing changes in chemical reactivity of cells.
Injury also occurs through damage to chromosomes, which can cause genetic mutations. The
degree of injury is dependent upon the type of particle, the amount o'7 energy in the emission,
and the type of tissue being irradiated. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOS-
[Vol. 16
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these deadly characteristics last virtually forever. Any technological so-
lution to radioactive waste disposal will essentially have to guarantee
complete and permanent isolation from the biosphere.3 3 It is critical that
careful oversight be required, both in the manner such waste is created
and how it is disposed. Thus, any system of regulatory oversight needs
to be broad enough to encompass all aspects of the problem.
B. The European Community Situation
The production and management of radioactive waste within the
E.C. is driven by the individual policies of Member-states. Each Com-
munity Member-state retains primary responsibility for the development
and regulation of its nuclear energy program and radioactive waste dis-
posal program.34 The result has been a diverse mix of nuclear energy3s
policies and disposal practices among individual Member-states.
Nuclear energy within the E.C. produces an increasing share of elec-
tricity. As of 1988, it represented 38% of total electricity generation.36
PHERE, supra note 14, at 75. For example, plutonium, a component of nuclear fuel and weap-
ons, is lethal when inhaled or swallowed in microscopic amounts. In one study, 100% of
beagle dogs that inhaled microscopic specks of plutonium weighing less than 0.0000015 of a
gram developed lung cancer. Lippman, supra note 3, at Al.
33. While this point is arguable with respect to LLW and some ILW, it is clear that, as far
as HLW is concerned, permanent isolation from the environment is universally accepted. See
Linsley & Vovk, supra note 26, at 26. Even with LLW and ILW, the case for isolation can be
made by pointing to examples such as Sellafield. Moreover, radioactive waste cannot be regu-
lated in the "cursory way in which conventional waste" is regulated. F.N. Browder & PJ.
Parsons, Control of Radioactive Waste Disposal, Lectures Given at the Training Course on
the Legal Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Apr. 16, 1968), in INI'L AToMIC EN-
ERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR LAW FOR A DEVELOPING WORLD 231, 231 (1969). There is one
principal distinction between radioactive waste and conventional waste that mandates different
treatment of the two. The radioactive character of nuclear waste cannot be eliminated by
outside forces; rather, it degrades at its own pace. One cannot transform the radioactivity
from one physical form to another as with other wastes. id.
34. As will be discussed, Euratom does provide some regulatory oversight regionally;
however, its authority to truly govern nuclear waste policy in an effective way is dubious at
best. Final authority to govern nuclear policy is in the hands of the individual sovereigns
which administer their nuclear programs. See generally J. McLoUGHLIN, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 371-418 (1976). Control of waste disposal is usu-
ally undertaken at the national level through the enactment of statues specifically dealing with
the utilization of nuclear power. Typically, such statutes would incorporate by reference de-
tailed technical regulations on the dispersal of radioactive materials into the environment.
Browder & Parsons, supra note 33, at 232-33.
35. The primary producer of radioactive waste, be it LLW, ILW, or HLW, is the nuclear
power industry. See Efremenkov, supra note 25, at 37. Within that industry, nuclear power
plants are the greatest producers of radioactive wastes, as opposed to fuel mining or transport.
Id. Waste is produced in the mining of fuel as well as in energy production. Id.
36. Nuclear powers share of E.C. electricity generation has seen significant growth, from
1993]
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For several reasons the E.C. is projecting that nuclear energy will make
up a proportionally larger share of future energy production. First, the
E.C. recognizes the environmental negatives37 of using hydrocarbons to
produce electricity. 38 More significantly, as a result of the 1957 Treaty of
Rome (E.E.C.), 39  as modified by the 1987 Single European Act
(S.E.A.),4 the E.C. is moving toward a completely integrated economic
community.41 Economic unification will result not only in increased eco-
nomic activity (with a corresponding increase in energy demand), but
also in the creation of a single market in energy.42 Increased demand for
energy production will foster a greater volume of radioactive waste pro-
duction. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency
("IAEA"), the projected volume of LLW for Europe will rise 53% from
150,000 cubic meters in 1988 to over 230,000 cubic meters by the year
2005. 43 For HLW, the increase will be over 50% fror 1400 cubic meters
in 1988 to 2100 cubic meters by the year 2 00 5.44 In addition, the pro-
8% in 1973, to 21% in 1982, to 38% in 1988. Energy, supra note 6, § 2.1.1. At this same
time, oil and natural gas represented a 45% and 17.9% share, respectively. Id.
37. The E.C. and nearly all other major industrialized nations (except the United States)
have adopted the policy target of stabilizing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Id. § 2.6.1.5.
The primary source of C02 emissions is the burning of hydrocarbons in industry and trans-
port. Id. C02 emissions are believed to be the primary cause of global warming. Id.
38. The E.C. has set as a policy objective that the proportion of electricity generated from
hydrocarbons should be reduced to less than 15%. It currently stands at 45%. Id § 2.1.2.
39. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY [herinafter E.E.C.
TREATY]. The E.E.C. consists of 12 Member-states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United King-
dom. Id.
40. SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT [hereinafter S.E.A. TREATY].
41. The result of unification has been the elimination of obstacles to free trade and a
harmonization of regulations to create a single market for goods consisting of over 300 million
consumers. The final stage of unification involves the creation of a single European currency
and a common monetary authority. The creation of a European Economic and Monetary
Union [EMU] will not occur until the Maastricht Treaty is ratified by all 12 member-statcs,
As of March 1993, the ratification process was still incomplete. Fact Sheet: European Cotmnu-
nity, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, AllWld
File.
42. See Energy, supra note 6, § 3. Generally, this will result in increased economic activ-
ity, about which a task force convened by the Commission to study the environmental dimen-
sions of 1992 unification has stated, "The Internal Market programme has a considerable
potential for negative impacts on environmental quality." Donald L. Morgan, EEC Enviro-
mental Policy and the Free Movement of Goods: The Significance of the Legal Basis for Environ-
mental Measures, 388 PRAC. L. INST. 299, 299 (1990). In response, the S.E.A. identifies
environmental protection as a major goal of the E.C. It expressly authorizes the E.E.C. to
enact environmental legislation and enumerates specific powers to implement that authority.
See S.E.A. TREATY art. 25 (stating that Title VII shall be added to Part Three of the E.E.C.
Treaty and be entitled "Environment").
43. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 10.
44. Id.
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jected volume of spent fuel from nuclear reactors will rise over 50% from
7000 cubic meters in 1988 to 10,500 cubic meters by the year 2005."'
The increase in radioactive waste volumes within the E.C. is not due
to a unified nuclear energy policy. Rather, it is the result of the interface
between the diverse range of individual Member-state nuclear programs.
This is because the principle regulation and management of nuclear en-
ergy is left with individual Member-states." Among Member-states, the
level of commitment to nuclear energy and the corresponding need to
dispose of radioactive waste can be divided into three tiers. At the top
are France, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the Federal Republic of
Germany (Germany). These countries are highly committed to nuclear
power and all possess significant nuclear energy programs. The next tier
is represented by those countries which possess intermediate nuclear pro-
grams. Belgium, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands fall into this category.
The final grouping consists of Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
and Portugal. These nations currently have no internal nuclear program.
Yet, regardless of the extent of a Member-state's nuclear commitment,
all Member-states are affected in some way by the growing level of radio-
active waste in the E.C.
1. Top Level Radioactive Waste Producers
France possesses the world's most ambitious nuclear energy pro-
gram with 53 nuclear power stations in operation supplying over 80% of
its total energy needs.4 7 Due to an oversupply of power, France is ac-
tively seeking to promote exports of cheap nuclear power within the Eu-
ropean Market.48 For example, France, in partnership with Germany,
will build and market nuclear power reactors within the E.C. Currently
45. Id.
46. See McLoUGHLIN, supra note 34, at 371-418. As will be discussed later, Euratom
does extend some regulation over the nuclear programs of E.C. Member-states; however,
Member-states retain significant discretion in the development and management of their nu-
clear programs. See infra notes 166-234 and accompanying text.
47. Nations Blow Hot and Cold, THE TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 20, 1991, at 1. Frances
nuclear plant capacity grew from 12.40 gigawatts (GWe) in 1980 to 50.77 OWe in 1990.
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 20. It is esti-
mated that by the year 2000 this figure would grow to over 62.40 GWe. Id. A gigawatt of
electricity is equal to one billion watts of power supplied through electrical generators. Id.
The French nuclear program attains these results through the use of a wide variety of reactors:
Pressurized Water Reactors, Gas-Cooled Graphite Moderated Reactors, Fast Breeder Reac-
tors, and Gas Cooled Heavy Water Moderated Reactors. Id.
48. France: EC Energy Policies a Window of Opportunity, E.C. ENERGY MONTHLY, Nov.
1989, at El. The E.C. Commission wholeheartedly supports France's expansion of its nuclear
power capacity to the point of oversupply. Id. In the Commission's view this provides other
E.C. Member-states with the means to reduce their imports of other energy fuels. Id.
1993]
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there are over 104 reactors on order from this partnership.49 Moreover,
beginning in 1999 the French nuclear fuels processing group will increase
the amount of spent fuel reprocessed, in an effort to develop an E.C.
market for fuel reprocessing." The result of this aggressive push into
nuclear energy will leave France with the task of accomodating increas-
ing amounts of radioactive waste. 5'
France has approached its waste disposal options through a variety
of methods. For LLW and ILW, the waste is first treated to reduce its
volume and then disposed of in shallow trenches or specialized land-
fills.52 From 1954 to 1969, the French reprocessing plant at La Hague
discharged LLW directly into the English Channel.5 3 With HLW the
options are narrowed because no viable disposal solution exists. At pres-
ent, France is evaluating the potential of several locations within its terri-
tory for a HLW repository. 4 In the meantime, France is storing HLW
and spent fuel in holding tanks at nuclear reactors and at off-site storage
facilities.5
The U.K. relies to a lesser extent on nuclear power for its energy
49. Id.
50. Id. France has two reprocessing plants, one located at La Hague and another at
Marcoule. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 20,
In addition to reprocessing E.C. spent fuel, France is encouraging eastern European countries
to send their spent fuel to the West for reprocessing. Michael Z. Wise, Nuclear Waste Piling
Up in Eastern Europe, WASH. POST, July 17, 1991, at A16. France has also agreed to take
Iraqi nuclear waste recovered after the Gulf War. Kerry Gill, Iraqi Nuclear Waste Is Destined
for Dounreay, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 1991, at 1. Although reprocessing does allow for
re-use of part of the spent fuel, the process still results in radioactive waste by-product. See
supra note 24 (describing reprocessing generally).
51. By 1980 France had accumulated 5,848 metric tons of uranium from spent fuel.
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 21. In 1990 that
figure grew to 18,100 metric tons and was projected to rise to over 35,300 metric tons by the
year 2000. Id.
52. France has also incinerated some of this type of waste. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at
8.
53. Discharges of LLW by the Marcoule reprocessing plant also occurred into the Rhone
river as well. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 30-
31. Although France discontinued ocean dumping of LLW in 1969, it is still considering
ocean disposal for certain types of radioactive waste, such as tritium and iodine (which can be
diluted in seawater) as part of its national waste management program. Id. (citing Jean-Louis
Hyacinthe, French Radioactive Waste Disposal Practices (presentation before the Nat'l Advi-
sory Comm. on Oceans and Atmosphere, Wash., D.C., Mar. 7, 1983)).
54. A repository is projected to be operational by the year 2009. When a site is in opera-
tion, French plans call for the HLW to be encased in glass and buried deep in a geologically
stable area. France: EC Energy Policies a Window of Opportunity, supra note 48, at El. While
most of the delay in selecting a location is technical, some of it is due to local and national
political opposition. This is even true with LLW where a recent proposal to dispose of 280,000
tons of LLW was rejected by over 96% of the local voters. Id.
55. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 8-9.
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needs. Nuclear power accounts for approximately 19% of its total elec-
tricity output.56 However, the U.K. possesses a significantly larger nu-
clear fuel reprocessing capacity." Because of its emphasis on
reprocessing, the U.K. has a greater volume of radioactive waste to con-
tend with than France.5"
The U.K.'s response to its radioactive waste problem is perhaps the
most controversial of any E.C. Member-state. Like France, the U.K.
disposes of its LLW by treating it and then disposing of it in shallow
trenches.59 Between 1950 and 1967, the U.K. disposed of significant
amounts of LLW into an ocean site located near the Bay of Biscay in the
North Atlantic. LLW was also disposed into the "Hurd Deep" located
twenty miles north of the Channel Islands.'o LLW from Dounreay, one
of the U.K.'s reprocessing plants, has been dumped into the Atlantic
Ocean since 1958.61 The Sellafield reprocessing plant has also discharged
significant amounts of LLW and ILW into the Irish Sea since 1952, mak-
ing it the largest radioactive body of water in the world.6" The Irish
56. Johnathan Kapstein, The Fallout From Chernobyl Is Still Spreading, Bus. WEEK,
May 16, 1988, at 112D. Even so, the U.K.'s nuclear plant capacity grew from 6.45 Gwe in
1980 to over 11.24 Gwe by 1990. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE,
supra note 14, at 20. It is projected that this growth will continue, with nuclear plant capacity
becoming 13.55 Gwe by the year 2000. Id.
57. Sellafield, which began operations in 1947, is the world's largest nuclear reprocessing
facility and the world's oldest nuclear power plant. Over 11,000 people are employed by the
plant. It receives spent fuel for reprocessing from client countries around the world, such as
Japan, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, and Spain. DeYoung, supra note 5, at
Al. In addition to Sellafield, the U.K. also has a reprocessing plant at Dounreay. NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 30-31. The U.K., like
France, has been accepting spent fuel for reprocessing from eastern European countries and
Iraq. See Wise, supra note 50, at A16; Gill, supra note 50, at 1.
58. As of 1980, England had accumulated over 18,250 metric tons of uranium from spent
fuel. By 1990, that amount had grown to over 35,032 metric tons and was projected to rise to
over 40,330 metric tons by the year 2000. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND AT-
MOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 20.
59. Some LLW is stored in repositories as well as incinerated. Zhu & Chan, supra note
11, at 8. The U.K. has chosen a site in Cumbra near the Sellafield reprocessing plant in which
to locate its first major repository for LLW and ILW. Ronald Faux, Sellafield Site Is Chosen
for Nuclear Dump, THE TIMES (London), July 24, 1991, at 1.
60. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 29.
Most of this waste was packed into 55-gallon drums weighted with concrete. Id.
61. Id. at 31.
62. Sellafleld has also been the site of several other "incidents" which have resulted in
large discharges of radioactivity into the environment. In 1957, when the plant was being used
to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, it caught fire and spewed radiation across the
country. The government established a contamination area of 200 miles. DeYoung, supra
note 5, at Al. In 1983, an unintended discharge of radioactive sludge washed onto a beach
which, coupled with documented sea and air discharges, brought radiation to levels 10,000
times natural background levels. Id. As a result of those discharges, a British court found
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government has lodged complaints with both the U.K. government and
the E.C. about the Sellafield operation.63 In addressing its HLW prob-
lem, the U.K. has yet to finalize a long-term plan. Currently, the U.K. is
storing its HLW in holding tanks at reprocessing plants and in concrete
encasements. 6 As of yet, no site has been selected. It is projected that a
workable repository will not be in operation until sometime beyond the
year 2020.65
Germany generates approximately 40% of its total electricity needs
through nuclear power.66 However, due to the negative attitudes toward
nuclear energy caused by the Chernobyl accident,67 as well as the nega-
tive political support for nuclear power generally, no further construc-
tion of nuclear power plants are planned for the foreseeable future.
Recent changes brought about by the unification of East and West Ger-
many have further impacted Germany's nuclear energy program. 68 Ger-
many also recently abandoned domestic reprocessing of its spent nuclear
fuel for political and economic reasons. 69 Despite its move away from
nuclear power, Germany is accumulating an increasing volume of HLW
British Nuclear Fuels, Inc. (which manages Sellafield) guilty of violating its own code. Id. In
1986, nearly a ton of uranium was inadvertently dumped into the Irish Sea. The cancer rate of
children in villages located close to Sellafield is nearly 1,000 times the national average. See
Alan Franks, What Will He Tell the Children?, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 20, 1990. See
generally MARILYNNE ROBINSON, MOTHER COUNTRY (1989).
63. Ireland currently has a standing request with the European Commission asking that
the Sellafield plant be closed. DeYoung, supra note 5, at Al. However, the effectiveness of the
European Commission is limited. The U.K. is claiming Sellafield is used for military purposes,
thus bringing it within the military exemption in Euratom. See EURATOM TREATY art. 84.
Note, however, the U.K. has insisted for years that the site's security-sensitive functions are
minimal. Further, most of the reprocessing it does provide is for civilian purposes. DeYoung,
supra note 5, at Al.
64. Some of the waste is being processed into glass blocks for storage. Ray Clancy, Brit-
ain Lacks Plan for Nuclear Waste, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 17, 1990, at I.
65. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 8-9.
66. NUCLEAR WASTE TECH. REV. BOARD, THIRD REPORT TO TlE CONGRESS AND THE
U.S. SECRETARY OF ENERGY D-7 (1991). By the end of 1989, there were 21 nuclear power
plants in operation in West Germany. Annually, these installations use approximately 400
metric tons of spent nuclear fuel. Id.
67. On April 26, 1986, a chemical explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the
former Soviet Union caused the largest single release of radioactive elements in the history of
nuclear power. The accident left 31 people known dead in the vicinity of the plant and tens of
thousands at risk for cancer throughout the Soviet Union and Europe. See Barron, supra note
1, at 647. Chernobyl also impacted Germany economically by forcing the destruction of vari-
ous contaminated commodities. Kapstein, supra note 56, at 112D.
68. Since unification, five nuclear power plants have been deemed unsafe and were to be
shut down by January 1, 1991. The decommissioning of nuclear power plants results in the
creation of additional radioactive waste that also impacts nuclear waste disposal plans. NU-
CLEAR WASTE TECH. REv. BOARD, supra note 66, at D-7.
69. Germany currently is relying entirely on France and the U.K. for reprocessing serv-
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from its existing nuclear program."
Currently, Germany deals with its LLW ' and ILW by burial in a
repository after treatment and packing to reduce its volume."' Wet stor-
age of HLW and spent fuel is provided at most reactors for an average of
three to ten years. 73 Interim storage at off-site locations for spent fuel
also occurs.7 4 In terms of finding a permanent HLW repository, Ger-
many is the closest of any E.C. Member-state to having a working site.
Germany has selected a repository site, constructed an underground re-
search laboratory, and is presently examining the potential for perma-
nent disposal of reconditioned HLW and spent fuel." It is estimated
that a repository will be in operation sometime after the year 2000.6
Despite its lead in dealing with radioactive waste, Germany's pro-
gram has had some problems. The Chernobyl accident affected Ger-
many more profoundly than any other Member-state. In addition, false
labeling and bribes to workers at nuclear power plants in Germany have
resulted in the circumvention of regulations controlling the movement
and storage of radioactive waste. Investigations in 1987 revealed that
321 fifty-five gallon storage drums purporting to carry LLW German re-
actor waste actually held HLW from Belgium. 77
ices. Id. Waste resulting from reprocessing is being shipped back to Germany for disposal.
Id.
70. In 1980, Germany had accumulated 963 metric tons of uranium from spent fuel. By
1990, that figure had grown to 4,550 metric tons and was projected to increase to over 10,500
metric tons by the year 2000. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE,
supra note 14, at 21.
71. In 1967, Germany disposed of some LLW into the ocean. Some disposal of LLW was
also made into the Rhine river in 1971. Id at 29, 31.
72. The Asse II salt mine currently holds 124,500 drums of LLW and 1,300 drums of
ILW. However, continued storage of LLW and ILW was suspended because of political resist-
ance. NUCLEAR WASTE TECH. REV. BOARD, supra note 66, at D-1 1.
73. In reactors that possess less wet storage capacity, waste is held in dry storage in cast
iron casks. Id at D-9.
74. If spent fuel is reprocessed, it will be transferred to a foreign reprocessing facility
within one to five years from discharge from the reactor. The remaining high.level liquid
waste is vitrified (solidified) and held in dry storage. Id
75. The site is the Gorleben salt dome. The advantages of utilizing a salt dome as a
repository are: (a) an absence of water, (b) the ability of the salt to be self-sealing, thus isolat-
ing waste from fissures and drillholes; (c) the heat conductivity of salt; and (d) the ease of
conducting mining operations in salt. Id at D-10. See also Larsson, supra note 27 at 20-21.
76. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 8-9.
77. The manager of what was Germany's leading nuclear waste management firm (Trans-
nuklear) was sentenced to 2 years in jail for bribing nuclear plant employees with embezzled
funds to illegally store falsely labeled barrels of nuclear waste throughout Germany. In the
months following the investigation, the German nuclear authority suspended Transnuklear's
license. Judge Sentences Nuclear Waste Manager for Bribery, U.P.I., July 8, 1991, at l, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. In light of this case, one E.C. official stated, "Nuclear
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2. Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Producers
The next tier of E.C. nuclear energy producers, with an intermediate
level of commitment, are Belgium, 78 Spain, 79 Italy,80 and the Nether-
lands". The nuclear programs of these four E.C. Member-states are
more conservative than those of France, the U.K and Germany. While
each of these intermediate countries is increasing its nuclear energy ca-
pacities, each is doing so at a different rate. As a result, each is exper-
iencing rising levels of radioactive waste, although not at the volumes
seen by the major European nuclear countries.8 2
These intermediate nuclear countries approach radioactive waste
disposal in ways similar to the E.C.'s largest nuclear energy producers.
waste isn't effectively tracked... [N]o one has an overall view of where it is, where it comes
from or where it goes." Kapstein, supra note 56, at 112D. As a result, members of the Euro-
pean Parliament are calling for the Commission to revise the Euratom Treaty to provide more
authority over the cross-border risks of nuclear waste. MEPs Press for Co-operation on
Euratom Procedures, E.C. ENERGY MONTHLY, July 1991, at 1. Currently, a proposal is pend-
ing before the European Parliament and Council for a system of ptior authorizations for all
movements and transfers of radioactive waste. Proposal for Protection Against the Dangers of
Ionizing Radiation; Transport of Radioactive Waste, 1990 O.J. (C 168) 7.10.
78. As of 1990, Belgium had 8 nuclear power plants with a capacity of 5.40 Owe. This is
projected to increase to 8.00 Gwe by the year 2000. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS
AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 20. At present, Belgium receives 67% of its total elec-
tricity output from nuclear energy. See Kapstein, supra note 56, at 112D.
79. As of 1990, Spain had 10 nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 7.48 Owe.
Projections call for this to increase to over 10.18 Gwe by the year 2000. NAT'L ADVISORY
COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 20. Spain receives 29.4% of its total
electricity output from nuclear energy. See Kapstein, supra note 56, at 112D.
80. As of 1990, Italy's nuclear power program included 3 power plants which produce
1.28 Gwe. By the year 2000, this is estimated to increase to over 6.70 Gwe. NAT'L ADVISORY
COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 20. Italy, at present, receives 6.2%
of its total electricity output from nuclear power. See Kapstein, supra note 56, at 112D.
81. The Netherlands' nuclear program is the most modest of this intermediate group,
possessing 2 nuclear power plants with a capacity of 0.51 Gwe. Unlike Belgium, Spain, or
Italy, the Netherlands' nuclear capacity is projected to decrease to 0.45 Gwe by the year 2000.
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 20. Nuclear
energy supplies 16.6% of the Netherlands' total electricity output. See Kapstein, supra note
56, at 112D.
82. Belgium currently has 1,290 metric tons of accumulated uranium from spent fuel (up
from 190 metric tons in 1980). This volume is projected to increase to over 3,100 metric tons
by the year 2000. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at
21. Spain likewise is experiencing an increase in its volume of HLW, from 676 metric tons in
1980 to over 2,420 metric tons in 1990. By the year 2000, Spain is projected to have over 5,140
metric tons of uranium from spent fuel. Id. Italy's accumulation of spent fuel waste has
grown from 1,067 metric tons in 1980 to over 1,980 metric tons in 1990. Italy is expected to
have, by the year 2000, over 3,630 metric tons of uranium accumulated from spent fuel, Id.
The Netherlands has seen its accumulation of spent fuel grow from 103 metric tons in 1980 to
270 metric tons in 1990. This is projected to increase to over 430 tons by the year 2000,
despite an estimated reduction in its total nuclear power capacity for the same period. Id.
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For example, Belgium and the Netherlands commonly dispose of their
LLW and ILW in a repository after treatment and packing. 3 In addi-
tion, both countries have engaged in the dumping of LLW and ILW into
the ocean." Spain and Italy each dispose of their LLW and ILW by
dumping it into shallow land trenches after treatment and packing.8 5
The situation with HLW is less unified, with each country in different
stages of repository development. Belgium is at the most advanced stage,
having selected a site and commenced construction of an underground
research laboratory.86 The Netherlands and Spain are each investigating
sites suitable for construction of a repository. Neither is anticipated to
have a site operational until sometime after the year 2010.7 Italy cur-
rently has plans to dispose of its HLW in a repository, but has yet to
move beyond the planning phase. 8
3. Non-Nuclear European Community Member-states
The countries in the final group: Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Lux-
embourg, and Portugal, are each similar in that each possesses either a
minimal or no nuclear power program. 9 The primary resistance to nu-
83. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 8.
84. From 1950 to 1967, Belgium disposed of significant quantities of LLW into the "Hurd
Deep" located approximately 20 miles north of the Channel Islands. The waste was packed in
55-gallon drums and sealed with concrete. The Netherlands disposed of LLW into the ocean
in 1967 and 1969 under international supervision. In addition, both Belgium and the Nether-
lands continued to dump LLW into the North Atlantic until 1983, when the London Conven-
tion Moratorium on Ocean Dumping was signed. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND
ATMOSPHERE, supra note 14, at 29-30. Both countries have also dumped waste off the Spanish
coast. In 1982 Spain complained about the dumping to the governments of Belgium and the
Netherlands. This was shortly after two Dutch ships, loaded with over 5,000 tons of nuclear
waste (from Belgium and Switzerland), left Denmark for a dump site 400 miles off the coast of
Spain. Spain expressed concern and urged them "to look into other methods of radioactive
waste disposal." Spanish Dumping, REUTERS NORTH EUROPEAN SERVICE, Sept. 6, 1982, at
1.
85. Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 8. Neither Spain nor Italy are involved in ocean dump-
ing of LLW or ILW.
86. Currently, Belgium is investigating the suitability of its site for HLW disposal. When
the country does begin disposal, much of its HLW will be converted to glass blocks. Id at 8.
Belgium does send some of its spent fuel to foreign reprocessors. Id.
87. Both the Netherlands and Spain do send some of their HLW to reprocessors. The
final waste form of each country's HLW will be glass blocks. Id at 8-9.
88. Id at 9.
89. It should be noted that although these countries do not support an independent nu-
clear program, they do import electricity that is produced by nuclear power from other Mem-
ber-states. For example, Denmark receives approximately 7% of its total electricity from such
sources. Dutch Prepare To Lift Nuclear Freeze, POL. RISK SERVICES, May 17, 1991. Further,
these countries utilize conduits through which nuclear waste is shipped. See Spanish Dump-
ing, supra note 84, at 1.
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clear power in these countries is politically driven by apprehension of the
environmental risks of nuclear energy.90 This basic distinction often
places these countries at odds with other E.C. Member-states over indi-
vidual nuclear energy policies. The issue confronting the E.C. is whether
the existing system of radioactive waste control, resting primarily with
the Member-states, is the best vehicle to guide Community radioactive
waste policy.
4. Conclusion: Radioactive Waste in the European Community
Nuclear energy policy within the E.C. is premised upon individual
Member-state control. Individual Member-states have attained varying
degrees of maturity with respect to their nuclear programs. Some Mem-
ber-states, such as France, actively promote nuclear energy as an indus-
try, while others, such as Greece or Ireland, eschew any form of nuclear
energy development. 91 With little or insubstantial regulation over the
interaction of individual policies, a growing need exists for a regulatory
scheme governing the management of radioactive waste within the Com-
munity at large.92 Lack of unified regional control has in turn led to
increasing difficulties concerning radioactive waste disposal.
The highly toxic quality of radioactive waste alone justifies a more
careful and forward looking approach to its regulation. Distinct from
other types of pollution that have potential transnational effects, radioac-
tive waste is extremely long lasting and virtually undetectable. 93
The disposal of radioactive waste is inherently problematic, but this
is only one dimension of the problem. The other is the diverse range of
nuclear programs within the E.C. Any decision involving radioactive
waste disposal has the potential to significantly affect other Member-
90. Dobbs, supra note 1, at A22; see also Kapstein, supra note 56, at 112D.
91. While differences in nuclear energy policies do exist between Member-states, in prac-
tice even those Member-states who do not support a nuclear energy program still derive some
benefits from the nuclear programs of other Member-states. See supra note 89.
92. As Part IV will demonstrate, Euratom does provide some regional regulation over
radioactive waste disposal. However, the ability of Euratom to effectively manage the wide
array of nuclear energy policies within the E.C. is limited because of its dependence on individ-
ual Member-states for compliance and effect. Aside from compliance, Euratom also fails to
directly address radioactive waste in a comprehensive manner. See infra part IV.C.
93. See supra notes 10-33 and accompanying text. Radioactive waste also possesses the
ability to "infect" biological processes and move up the food chain, even if direct contamina-
tion is avoided. DeYoung, supra note 5, at Al. Finally, unlike other waste products, most
radioactive waste cannot be neutralized by outside forces and must degrade over time in com-
plete isolation from the environment. See Browder & Parsons, supra note 33, at 231. For a
description of recent efforts of the United States to develop a neutralizing process, see Daniel
Gibson, Seeking a Solution to "The Ultimate Pollution,", L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1991, at B3.
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states. The example of Sellafield illustrates the failure of individual
Member-state regulation to properly consider the interests of other Mem-
ber-states.94 Further, the numerous incidents of ocean dumping demon-
strate the dangers of relying on the prudence of individual Member-states
to consider the long-term interests of the whole Community.9"
Independent of the direct effects of Member-state disposal practices
are the ineffectual efforts to control the regional problems associated with
radioactive waste. First, although the E.C. has successfully promoted
the development of nuclear energy, it has done little to consider the long-
term implications of this goal.96 Second, it is impossible to effectively
track the transport of radioactive waste or nuclear materials within the
Community. 7 Finally, even in times of emergency, where the response
of Member-states and the Community should be at its most effective, the
result has been dangerously disappointing.98
94. See supra notes 58, 62, 63.
95. See, eg., supra notes 84, 85.
96. EURATOM TREATY art. 1; see also infra notes 139-65 and accompanying text. For
example, all Member-states which possess a nuclear energy program have invested heavily in
the development of nuclear energy capacity. Yet this was done with no effective solution to the
disposal of HLW, a necessary by-product of producing energy with nuclear substances. As a
result, there now exists a situation where HLW is piling up at nuclear reactors or off-site
storage facilities to the point where, in the words of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
"[s]erious storage problems are facing some power plants." Zhu & Chan, supra note 11, at 11;
see also supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text. Despite this seemingly significant problem,
the E.C. is increasing nuclear energy capacity and with it nuclear waste volumes. See supra
notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
Moreover, many decisions involving the disposal of highly toxic nuclear waste essentially
involve all-or-nothing propositions. For example, if HLW is buried in a deep geological repos-
itory, it must be guaranteed not to leach waste material. If this were to happen, not only
would it be difficult to discover prior to wide exposure, but it would be virtually impossible to
remedy in a technical sense. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 77; see also infra note 213. With the advent of the Single European
Market and the corresponding abolition of border controls, the problems in monitoring trans-
national shipments of radioactive waste will be compounded. Energj: EC Commission's
Plans for 1993, EUR. REP., Jan. 16, 1993, at 1. The European Court of Justice has recently
decided a case which supports this contention. It held that Member-states cannot refuse entry
to hazardous wastes under existing European law. Member-states are still permitted to ban
certain types of waste products on health and environmental grounds. See David Gradener,
FC Court Refuses To Block Toxic Waste, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 1992, at 1. Greenpeace has
warned that E.C. members are promoting trafficking in radioactive waste. E.C. Energy
Monthly, R C Accused of Promoting Waste Trafficking, Aug. 14, 1992, at 1.
As a result, the E.C. appears to be taking some steps to address the problem. The 12
Member-states which comprise the E.C. have recently approved legislation which puts tighter
controls on the movement of radioactive wastes among Member-states and third-party coun-
tries. See Transfer of Radioactive Waste, 1992 O.J. (L 35) 12.02; see also Legislation on Radio-
active Waste, POWER EUR., Feb. 13, 1993, at 1.
98. The E.C.'s response to the accident at Chernobyl was hamstrung by the E.C.'s inabil-
ity to get accurate information. See infra note 203 and accompanying text. Moreover, the
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Thus, a myopic Member-state approach to regulation of radioactive
waste or nuclear materials cannot effectively address the legitimate con-
cerns of third-party Member-states. Yet, the ineffectiveness that individ-
ual state control of radioactive waste brings does not alone compel the
conclusion that centralizing regulatory authority is the solution. How-
ever, the fact that nuclear energy has been developed and promoted on a
Community-wide level strongly suggests that control of radioactive waste
should be vested in the Community. This is especially true given that the
availability and exploitation of nuclear energy is the prime directive of
Euratom.99 It is the E.C. which is calling for increases in nuclear energy
production. Finally, because land in the E.C. is "very limited and a
much sought after natural resource," the best disposal solutions will re-
quire an analysis of the entire geographic region."0
The existing Member-state approach cannot anticipate potential ef-
fects of individual nuclear energy programs on the E.C. as a whole, nor
can it adequately protect the rights of individual Member-states. Au-
thority to regulate radioactive waste within the Community should be
centralized. As will be discussed, since Euratom is the existing body re-
sponsible for E.C. nuclear energy policy, its ability to oversee and man-
age radioactive waste should be enhanced.1"'
actual response to the accident was uncoordinated and ineffectual. See infra note 175; see also
Jurgen Grunwald, The Role of Euratom, in NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW AFrER CHERNOBYL 33,
33-34 (Peter Cameron et al. eds., 1988) ("The Community Member states each reacted in
divergent ways, some simply ignoring what had happened or playing down its consequences,
some issuing ad hoe recommendations through the media and others trying to... implement
elaborate control systems based on contamination limits extrapolated on the spur of the
moment.").
99. See infra notes 139-65 and accompanying text.
100. Susan Polizzotto & Patricia L. LaTulippe, Comment, The European Community in
1992: An Integrated Approach to Economy and Ecology, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1759, 1763
(1990). The territorial area of the E.C. is approximately 25% of the size of the United States
(911,817 sq. mi. vs. 3,618,000 sq. mi.). However, the E.C. has a population which is over 37%
greater than that of the United States (343.5 million vs. 251.1 million). As a result, the Com-
munity's population density is significantly higher than that of the United States (376.7 per-
son/sq. mi. vs. 69.3 person/sq. mi.). E.C. DELEGATION TO THE U.S., GUIDE TO THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 24 (1991). What this means for nuclear waste disposal is that any
disposal site located within the E.C. will be close to significant numbers of people. This makes
it even more critical to find the best location within the Community in which to locate disposal
sites. Given the difficulty the United States has encountered in attempting to find an appropri-
ate location for its HLW repository, it is no surprise that the E.C. has even a greater burden.
See Yates, supra note 5, at 52. The difficulty in finding geological conditions suitable for waste
disposal makes it likely that the best site for a repository may only be in a few E.C. Member-
states. It is almost certainly true that such ideal conditions do not exist in each country with a
need for such a disposal site.
101. It is evident that for any transfer of authority from Member-state to Community to
occur, the political will to relinquish power must exist. See Hugo J. Hahn, EURA TOM: The
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I. THE EURATOM TREATY
A. The Background to Ratification
The establishment of Euratom as a separate "Community" must be
examined within the context of the prevailing political, social, and scien-
tific climate in the years following World War II. Euratom, like the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the European Coal and Steel
Community (E.C.S.C.), is a supemational entity with the capacity to act
as an independent sovereign."°2 Together, Euratom, E.E.C. and E.C.S.C.
form what is known as the E.C.103
Shortly after the end of World War II, the Treaty establishing the
E.C.S.C. was signed. This Treaty reflected the desire of the six founding
states "to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential inter-
ests; to establish an economic community, the foundation, ... and to lay
the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future com-
mon destiny."' 4 The E.C.S.C. Treaty aimed at integration through the
establishment of a common market in coal and steel, at the time consid-
ered the essential raw materials. 105 Yet, with the development of nuclear
power in other countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union,
this was changing. The emerging importance of nuclear power to the
E.C. was accentuated with the failure to establish a European Defense
Community. 6 It was felt that, even as a group, the six non-nuclear
European nations would be technologically inferior compared to the
United States and the Soviet Union.10 7 According to the Spaak report,103
it was necessary to establish alongside the E.C.S.C. and the E.E.C. a sep-
Conception of an International Personality, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1001, 1011 (1958). Whether the
Member-states possess the political will to accomplish such a transfer is beyond the scope of
this Note. Rather, this Note is concerned with the prudence and legality of centralizing more
authority in Euratom to regulate radioactive waste disposal on a Community-wide basis.
102. See EURATOM. The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,
INT'L Bus. LAW., May 1990, at 227, 228.
103. HJ. Glaesner, The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), in NUCLEAR
LAW FOR A DEVELOPING WORLD 39, 39 (1968).
104. The original six Member-states of the E.C.S.C. were France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 259.
105. CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 742.
106. The Treaty seeking to establish the European Defense Community was rejected by the
French National Assembly on August 30, 1954. The primary obstacle was a reluctance to
surrender sovereignty in the area of military affairs. Hahn, supra note 101, at 1002.
107. Campbell, supra note 9, at 742.
108. This report was compiled under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, by
a commission appointed at Messina, Italy, in 1955. The commission was entrusted with the
preparation of a report on the measures necessary for the continued integration in western
Europe. The report recommended the creation of two additional communities: the European
Atomic Energy Authority and the European Economic Community. VANDA LAMM, THE
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arate organization to promote the development of a nuclear industry
among the the six Member-states. The report expressed out two primary
reasons for its conclusion that a separate institution within European in-
tegration was necessary to deal with nuclear issues:(a) the insufficient de-
velopment of nuclear research in Western European Countries; 10 9 and
(b) the need to overcome the shortage of energy likely to occur within the
next ten years. 0 Thus, Euratom was intended to serve as a mechanism
for increasing domestic energy supplies and to help counter the rising
cost of conventional energy sources."' In addition, it was directed at
assisting the development of atomic technology among the "six."' 112 The
Spaak report proposed that Euratom confine itself to set areas of activity
to attain its objectives.1 3 The Euratom Treaty was ratified jointly with
the E.E.C. Treaty by the same six nations who were members of the
E.C.S.C. It entered into force on January 1, 1958.114 With the creation
of Euratom emerged an institution of supranational character, with the
capacity to bind Member-states through legislation, without the interven-
tion of national governments.' The Euratom Treaty does not extin-
guish the national sovereignty of its members, but rather restricts it in
UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (1984); see also JAROS-
LAV G. POLACH, EURATOM 23 (1964).
109. There was a growing concern with what was viewed as a technological gap between
the original six and the nuclear powers of the world. Glaesner, supra note 103, at 39.
110. LAMM, supra note 108, at 102.
11I. It was believed by Europeans that atomic power would provide an answer to geo-
graphic differences in economic growth. In this sense, Europe wanted to use Euratom inter-
nally to improve the welfare of its citizens. EURATOM: The Treaty Establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community, supra note 102, at 228.
112. It should be noted that the "six" realized that individually they did not possess tile
resources to accomplish such a task. In this way, Euratom was being used externally to estab-
lish Europe's political, economic, and atomic equality with the rest of the world. Id. at 228.
Euratom was not intended to aid in the development of atomic technology for military pur-
poses, but only only for peaceful civil uses. See Hahn, supra note 101, at 1002.
113. The "five areas of activity" it was proposed Euratom be restricted were:
i) to develop research and ensure general dissemination of nuclear knowledge
and techniques;
ii) to establish and apply uniform nuclear safety standards for the protection of
labor and population;
iii) to facilitate atomic investment and undertake such fundamental installations
as could not be undertaken alone by individuals, industries, or countries;
iv) to ensure supply of atomic ores and fuels under conditions of equality;
v) to assure a large market and use of the best techniques by fusion of national
markets for specialist nuclear materials and equipment, as well as by the free move-
ment of specialists.
POLACH, supra note 108, at 28 (quoting the Spaak Report, discussed supra note 108, at 102).
114. CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 742.
115. Currently there are 12 members of Euratom: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, the U.K., Spain, and Portugal. COM-
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favor of its creation as a separate sovereign. 16 In this context, Euratom
possesses an independent legal personality."1 7
B. The Institutional Framework of Euratom
Although each of the Communities is now managed by common
institutions, the institutions of a given Community still derive legitimacy
from their individual Treaty." The four basic institutions of Euratom
are: the European Assembly, the Council of Ministers (Council), the
Commission and the Court of Justice.1 19 In terms of the authority of
Euratom, Member-states are not merely passive constituent parts. The
accomplishment of the goals of Euratom depends greatly on the Mem-
ber-states affirmative and timely discharge of specific Treaty duties.'2 ° In
this sense, the institutions of Euratom acquire a supplementary role, with
much of the burden for success of the Treaty being born by the Member-
states. 121
The European Assembly is the parliament of Euratom. 1 2 It is not a
true parliament in that its primary function is advisory to the Council
MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES & EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE INSTITUTIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 2 (1991).
116. Hahn, supra note 101, at 1011.
117. EURATOM TREATY arts. 184-85.
118. Initially each of the three communities (the E.C.S.C., the E.E.C., and Euratom) had
separate institutional frameworks as provided within each treaty. However, shortly after the
signing of the Euratom Treaty, a Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the Euro-
pean Communities was concluded. It provided that the three Communities would be served
by a single Assembly and a single Court of Justice. This agreement was supplemented by a
Merger Treaty which fused the Councils and Commissions of the three separate Communities
into a single Council and Commission in 1969. EURA TOM: The Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community, supra note 102, at 228; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at
741.
119. EURATOM TREATY arts. 107-64. There also exists the Economic and Social Commit-
tee which represents the various scientific and technical employees of the Community. It is
wholly a consultative body with no independent authority to make policy. Id arts. 165-170.
120. For example, the Community is dependent on Member-states to establish facilities
necessary to control radioactivity in the environment as well as provide the Community with
information relating to the level of radioactivity in the environment likely to affect the popula-
tion. Id. arts. 35.36. Moreover, none of the institutions of the Community can perpetuate
itself. It is the obligation of the Member-states to renew the mandates of the office-holders in
these institutions. Id art. 127; see also POLACH, supra note 108, at 98.
121. "Euratom depends on the faithful performance of the contractual obligations by the
member states for its legal and political survival and has very few effective sanctions to stave
off the willful secession of a member state save the force of a [hopefully] growing interdepen-
dence of the nations taking part." Hahn, supra note 101, at 1011.
122. It is also referred to as the "European Parliament." Since 1979 its members have been
elected by universal suffrage by nationality. Currently, there are a total of 518 Assembly Mem-
bers who are elected every five years. France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. are each allotted
81 members; Spain has 60; the Netherlands has 25; Belgium, Greece, and Portugal each has
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and Commission. Within Euratom therefore, most legislation requires
that the Assembly only be "consulted" before the Council may act.12 3 In
some areas, as a result of the Single European Act, the Assembly does
enjoy an increased legislative role. 124 Yet, in most fields of Community
policy-making it still has no unilateral authority to intervene. 125
The Council is responsible for the major policy decisions of the
Community. 126 Yet, its policy-making capacity is conditioned on the
existence of a prior proposal by the Commission.' 2 ' The Council can
undertake some decisions by a majority vote, 128 when expressly provided
for by the Treaty, but unanimity is generally required.' 29
24; Denmark has 16; Ireland has 15; and Luxembourg has 6. THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 115, at 2.
123. However, the Assembly does have the power to dismiss the Commission by two-thirds
majority. This power has never been used. The Assembly also has the power to reject some
aspects of the Community budget. It has done so on two occasions. Id. at 4. Further, the
Assembly has the right to receive answers from the executive organs to all questions submitted
to them. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 104, at 264. Although some mat-
ters do require prior Assembly opinion before the Council or Commission can act, the advice
of the Assembly need not be followed. Thus, the Assembly's primary influence is political.
POLACH, supra note 108, at 108-09.
124. For example, as a result of the "cooperation procedure," certain legislation is now
given two readings through the Assembly and the Council. Whether such legislation is passed
by the Assembly determines if a qualified majority or unanimous vote is required for final
passage in the Council. Additionally, the Assembly is given veto power over the accession of
new Member-states. See S.E.A. TREATY, supra note 40, Title II.
125. Where the Council legislates in closed session and no cooperation procedure is re-
quired, it has been said that there exists a "democratic deficit." THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 115, at 5. The Assembly recently passed a resolution
calling on the Commission to extend its Euratom responsibilities and allow for greater parlia-
mentary participation in the legislative process. Procedurally, the Assembly is seeking to re-
place its present consultative role with one which gives it more control over the Council's law
making process. The "cooperation procedure" is presently not applicable to nuclear issues.
Substantively, the Assembly believes that Euratom should be amended to provide for more
long-term planning in the area of nuclear waste sites. The Commission's position is that
Euratom provides adequate protection of health as constituted. MEPs Press for Co-operation
on Euratom Procedures, supra note 77, at 1.
126. EURATOM TREATY arts. 115-23. The Council is composed of ministers representing
the national governments of the Member-states. Each government acts as President of the
Council for one six-month rotating term. Each member of the Council is politically responsi-
ble to his or her own government and not to the European Assembly.
127. Typically, the Commission will initiate a proposal which will be sent to the Assembly
for an opinion. The proposal along with the Assembly opinion then moves to the Council for
final consideration. While the Council cannot initiate legislation on its own, it does have the
authority to amend Commission proposals by unanimous agreement. THE INSTITUTIONS OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 115, at 6-7.
128. EURATOM TREATY art. 118.
129. Id. art. 119. The Council can only amend the Commission legislative proposals by
unanimous agreement.
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The Commission is the executive arm of the Community."a° Its pri-
mary functions include proposing policies and legislation, as well as ad-
ministering the operations of the Community. It ensures that the
provisions of the Euratom Treaty and the decisions of its institutions are
properly implemented.131
The Court of Justice represents the Community's legal branch. The
jurisdiction of the Court is broadly defined. 132 The role of the Court is to
review, at the request of a Community institution, Member-state, or indi-
vidual, any legal instrument or act adopted by the Commission, Council,
or any national government which is incompatible with E.C. law. More-
over, the Court, at the request of a national court, can pass on the valid-
ity or interpretation of a point of E.C. law. 133 Judgments by the Court
concerning E.C. law supersede and bind national courts.
The primary regulatory and legislative instruments through which
the various institutions act are regulations, directives, decisions, and rec-
ommendations (opinions). Regulations are binding in their entirety, self-
executing, and directly applicable to Member-states throughout the
E.C.134 Directives are binding as to the results to be achieved, but Mem-
ber-states are free to choose the most effective form and manner of imple-
mentation. 135 Decisions are binding in their entirety as to those parties
to whom they are addressed (Member-states, Community institutions or
individuals). 136 Recommendations or opinions are not binding and are
130. The Commission is composed of 17 members appointed by common agreement
among the Member-states. The Commissioners are to act in the best interests of the Commu-
nity independently of the national governments which nominated them. However, since term
lengths are limited to 4 years subject to renewal by Member-states' approval, Commissioners
are subject to some influence by their national governments. POLACH, supra note 108, at 105.
131. In this regard, it has investigative powers and can take legal action against persons,
companies, or Member-states that are in violation of Euratom. EURATOM TREATY art. 124.
For example, the Commission is empowered to impose direct fines for certain infringements of
Article 83. Id. art. 83.
132. Id art. 143. The Court's jurisdiction also includes appeals as to determinations of
licensing conditions and appeals brought against penalties imposed by the Commission. Id.
art. 144. It also reviews measures by the Council or Commission (other than recommenda-
tions or opinions). Id art. 146.
133. Id art. 150.
134. Id art. 161. Regulations take effect within each Member-state without any further
action by that state's national government. Id
135. Id. Generally, Member-states are required to adopt or amend legislation in conform-
ity with the corresponding directive. A deadline is usually set by which Member-states must
incorporate the Community provision into their national legislation. Before a directive is bind-
ing on an individual, it must be incorporated into national legislation. Polizzotto & LaTulippe,
supra note 100, at 1761. If a Member-state fails or inadequately implements a directive, a case
may be brought against it in the Court of Justice. Id
136. Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 100, at 1761.
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generally used in areas where it is believed more can be achieved by sug-
gestion than by compulsion.137 Whether the Community has the author-
ity to issue a regulation as opposed to an opinion is governed by specific
Treaty provisions. 138
C. The Scope of Euratom
The central directive of Euratom is set forth in Article 1 of the
Treaty, which states:
It shall be the aim of the Community to contribute to the rising of the
standard of living in Member States and to the development of com-
mercial exchanges with other countries by the creation of conditions
necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear
industries. 13
9
This objective gives rise to a series of activities (means) expressed in Arti-
cle 2 of the Treaty. These activities make up the eleven chapters of Title
II of the Treaty." Article 2 refers to the Development of Research
(Chapter I), the Dissemination of Information (Chapter II), Health Pro-
tection (Chapter III), Investments (Chapter IV), Joint Enterprises
(Chapter V), Supplies (Chapter VI), Safety Control (Chapter VII), Prop-
erty Rights (Chapter VIII), the Nuclear Common Market (Chapter IX),
and External Relations (Chapter X). 4 ' Article 2, while defining these
activities, does not confer direct powers on the Cormunity. The Com-
munity can only act "as provided in this Treaty."' 142 This limits both the
authority established for each Community institution and the form of
each sphere of activity.
137. Id.; POLACH, supra note 108, at 110.
138. For example, pursuant to Article 37, the Commission is empowered to give its opinion
as to whether a Member-state's radioactive waste plan "is likely to involve" contamination of
another Member-state's territory. Under Article 38, the Commission is obligated to issue a
directive in an urgent case involving radioactive contamination. It should be noted that with
some provisions there is no limitation as to the form of institutional action. EURATOM
TREATY arts. 37-38. Note that Article 161 defines only the range or permissible means by
which the aims of Euratom may be achieved (regulations, directives, decisions, and recommen-
dations or opinions). Id. art. 161.
139. Id. art. 1. The primary objective of the Treaty as expressed in this Article is to facili-
tate as quickly as possible the development, both technologically and commercially, of a nu-
clear power industry.
140. Id. art. 2.
141. Id.
142. Id. This illustrates a principle common to all three Communities (E.C.S.C., E.E.C,,
and Euratom), that a given Community may only exercise those powers given to it by the
signatory states. It is the relinquishment of certain powers by the Members-states to a specific
Community which creates its supernational character. See supra notes 102-17 and accompa-
nying text.
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One critical basis for Euratom is the development of research under
Chapter I of the Treaty. Under this Chapter, Euratom is limited as to
the fields of research it can pursue to those expressed in Annex I of the
Treaty. Generally included are the study and research of various nuclear
processes and specific types of nuclear fuel, the processing of radioactive
fuel, the effects of radiation and the economics of nuclear energy produc-
tion. 4 3 The principal role of the Community under this Chapter is sup-
plementary, in that it is "responsible for promoting and facilitating
nuclear research in Member States ..... ,1 However, the Community is
also empowered to implement its own research through the development
of five year "programmes."' 14
5
Since research under Chapter I is financed by public funds, there is
an interest in making the acquired knowledge available to all interested
parties. Chapter II (Dissemination of Information) imposes this obliga-
tion upon the Community. Specifically, Article 12 requires the Commis-
sion to grant to Member-states at their request non-exclusive licenses
under patents acquired by the Community. 14 Yet, the availability of
Community information is not without limits. Article 24 forms the basis
for measures protecting any Community information which might be
harmful to the defense interests of a Member-state.1 47
Two Chapters within the Treaty deal with the health and security
issues of Euratom. Chapter III is focused on health and safety protection
of Member-states from the effects of nuclear energy.1 48 Chapter VII is
143. See EURATOM TREATY Annex I.
144. Id. art. 4.
145. Ia art 7. These research programs have covered a wide range of subject areas. The
first of these was included within the Treaty, under Article 215 and Annex V, covering the
period from 1958 to 1962. Current research programs under Article 7 include: Research in the
field of decommissioning nuclear installations (1989 to 1993), Council Decision 89/239, art. 7,
1989 OJ. (L 98) 33; Research concerning the management and storage of radioactive waste
(1990 to 1994), Council Decision 89/664, art. 7, 1989 O.J. (L395) 28; as well as Research
concerning remote handling in hazardous or disordered nuclear environments (1989 to 1993),
Council Decision 89/464, art. 7, 1989 O.J. (L 226) 16. In conjunction with the implementa-
tion of research programs under Article 7, the Joint Research Center [JRC] was established to
conduct Community research. The JRC consists of 4 separate installations located in different
Member-states.
146. EURATOM TREATY art. 12. The Community may acquire patents by means of its own
research or by purchase. Under Articles 14-16, the means are provided for the Community to
obtain and disseminate confidential information in the atomic field. Article 16 obligates the
Community to communicate information relating to national patent applications to the Com-
mission. Id arts. 14-16.
147. IdL arts. 24-28.
148. Id arts. 30-39. These Articles will be analyzed in more detail in the next section,
which deals directly with Euratom's capacity to regulate radioactive waste.
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concerned with safety control of nuclear materials and their use. 149
The principal goal of Euratom is the promotion and "speedy estab-
lishment and growth of nuclear industries." ' Thus, a number of provi-
sions within Euratom are focused on facilitating commercial and
industrial activity within the nuclear sector. Under Chapter IV, the
Community provides guidance to interested industries by publishing pe-
riodic "programmes." These basically indicate production targets for
nuclear energy and the types of investments required for their attain-
ment.151 Pursuant to Chapter V, undertakings of "outstanding impor-
tance to the development of the nuclear industry in the Community"
may be undertaken as a "Joint Enterprise."15 2 Through direct participa-
tion with third parties, the Community is able to accelerate the progress
and application of its research activities.153
The Treaty gives Euratom substantial authority to control the sup-
ply of special fissionable material. Under Chapter VI, the supply of such
materials is based on the principal of equal access and a common supply
policy. 54 In conjunction with this principal, all practices which promote
a privileged position for certain users are prohibited.' 5 Further, to facil-
itate the common supply policy, an agency was created and given the
exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores,
source materials, or special fissionable materials coming from within or
149. Generally, the Commission is vested with control over the manner in which nuclear
materials are utilized within the Community. See id. arts. 77-84. This Chapter, like Chapter
III, will be dealt with in greater detail in the next section.
150. Id. art. 1.
151. Id. arts. 40-41. Under Article 41, "persons and undertaking3" are obligated to advise
the Commission as to their involvement in any investment projects. Id. art. 41. However, the
Commission's power in this regard is limited to the giving of an opinion. Id. art. 43, Far more
substantive is the ability of the Community to participate directly in investment under Articles
6, 47, 171-72, and 174.
152. Id. art. 45. Generally, development must be carried out in the context of a valid
research program and entitles participants to certain financial and administrative exemptions.
See id. Annex III.
153. CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 750. The Community engaged in such a cooperative
venture with the German nuclear authority in the construction and operation of a nuclear
merchant vessel, the Otto Hahn. Other similar engagements have been concluded to build
power stations and research centers in other E.C. countries and elsewhere. Id.
154. EURATOM TREATY art. 52. It should be noted that Article 76 of the Treaty was the
source of some controversy. Article 76 states, "The Council may, at the end of a period of
seven years after the date of the entry into force of this treaty, confirm these provisions In
tote." Id. art. 76. There was a question whether Chapter VI (Articles 52-75) remained in force
in absence of being "confirmed." This issue was resolved in the affirmative by the Court of
Justice. Case 7/71, Commission v. France, 1971 E.C.R. 1003.
155. EURATOM TREATY art. 52(2)(B).
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outside the Community.'56 As a necessary corollary for carrying out its
responsibilities under Euratom, the Commission under Chapter VIII is
vested with exclusive ownership of all special fissionable material defined
in Article 197.' The intent of this provision is to provide Euratom with
powers of direct control over fissionable material in which it is responsi-
ble for safety, security and health.15 s Member-states, persons or under-
takings are "constrained" in the use of such materials validly in their
possession,1 59 by their Treaty obligations. 16" One important exception to
the Community's exclusive property right, is that it does not extend to
materials intended or prepared for purposes of national defense or to
materials stored in military establishments. 161
Another fundamental premise under which Euratom is created was
that all Member-states should contribute to a general economic expan-
sion and a higher standard of welfare. The large capital and technical
requirements of developing and maintaining an atomic industry make the
existence of a nuclear common market indispensable.162 In establishing a
common market for nuclear source elements and other materials neces-
sary for use with nuclear energy, Chapter IX provides for an abolition of
156. Id. art. 52. In addition, the Agency has an option on the materials produced within
the Community. Id. arts. 57-58. Although the Agency possesses a monopoly over acquisition
rights for these materials, there have been some exceptions made pursuant to Article 74. For
example, an exception is permitted if the Agency cannot fulfill an order for supplies at a rea-
sonable price or within a reasonable time. Commission Regulation 17/66, 1966 OJ. (4057) 66;
EURATOM TREATY art. 66.
157. EURATOM TREATY art. 86. The property right in special fissionable materials of the
Community arises at the time of their production or import. P. J. G. KAPTEYN & P.
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION OF THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
AFTER THE AccEssioN OF NEW MEMBER STATES 339 (1973). If such materials have been
produced or imported by a Member-state, person, or undertaking, the price is refunded by the
Community through use of a special account. EURATOM TREATY arts. 88-89.
158. CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 751-52. As a result of ownership it is recognized that the
Community is authorized to: (i) exercise security control over the materials use; (ii) demand
that such materials be stored in places approved by the Commission; and (iii) forbid their
export when the Commission finds it is contrary to the Commission's interests. POLACH,
supra note 108, at 77.
159. EURATOM TREATY art. 87. Article 87 grants Member-states "unlimited rights of use
and consumption" of such material, provided they do not violate their obligations under
Euratom. In doing so, this Article appears to grant the principal attribute of owmership, the
vested right to "unlimited use and consumption," to the Member-states. In this way, Article
87 could be read to significantly dilute the Community's ownership authority under Article 86.
160. See, eg., id. art. 62(l)-(2).
161. Id. arts. 84-86. Note that Community ownership in special fissile materials is depen-
dent upon those materials being produced or imported by a Member-state and subject to safe-
guards under Chapter VII. Thus, Article 84, exempting "materials intended to meet defense
requirements" from safety controls, has the concurrent effect of divesting Community owner-
ship in these materials.
162. POLACH, supra note 108, at 90.
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customs duties and quantitative restrictions. 163 In addition, other meas-
ures exist which aid in the development of a common market for nuclear
resources. 64 Under Chapter X, numerous agreements and conventions
have been concluded between the Community and non-Euratom mem-
bers. Euratom Member-states still retain a right to independent interna-
tional activities, provided they do not impede the application of the
Euratom Treaty. 165
IV. RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL UNDER
EURATOM
Two bases within Euratom are relevant to the regulation of radioac-
tive waste: Chapter III (relating to Health & Safety) and Chapter VII
(relating to Safety Control).
A. EURATOM Chapter III: Health and Safety
Chapter III is the principal manner by which Euratom attempts to
regulate the disposal of radioactive waste. Articles 30 through 33 form
the basis of health and safety protection through the adoption of "basic
standards" relating to the "dangers arising from ionizing radiations."
Article 30 obligates the Community to establish basic standards for the
protection of the public against the dangers of radioactivity.' 66 Article
31 creates the political process by which the "basic standards" are devel-
oped.1 67 Acting pursuant to Article 31, the Council enacted the initial
163. EURATOM TREATY art. 93. The nuclear materials and goods to which Article 93 is
applicable are contained in lists Al and A2 of Annex IV of the Treaty.
164. Article 96 provides for the free movement of workers for specialized employment in
the nuclear field. Article 97 directly prohibits the application of restrictions, whether based on
nationality of natural persons or on legal entities that come within the jurisdiction of a Mcm-
ber-state. Article 98 obligates Member-states to take all measures necessary to facilitate tle
coverage of atomic risks by insurance. Finally, Article 99 provides that the Commission may
make recommendations as to the movement of capital intended to finance the branches of
industry enumerated in Annex II of the Treaty. Id. arts. 96-99.
165. Id. art. 103.
166. Article 30 states:
Basic standards shall be laid down within the Community for the protection of
the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing
radiations.
The expression "basic standards" means:
(a) maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety;
(b) maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination;
(c) the fundamental principals governing the health surveillance of workers.
Id art. 30.
167. Under Article 31, the basic standards are initially "worked out" by a group appointed
by the Scientific and Technical Committee. The final responsibility for establishment of the
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basic standards in 1959 and has since amended them. 6 At the request
of the Commission or a Member-state, the basic standards may be re-
vised by a qualified majority of the Council. 169
Although these standards are technical in nature, they are enacted
through directives as opposed to regulations.170  Article 33 compels
Member-states to implement the enacted standards whether by legisla-
tion or regulation, to ensure compliance.17' It also requires that all rele-
vant information pertaining to local or national legislation, regulations or
administrative provisions be submitted to the Commission before these
standards are formally adopted by a Member-state. 72 The Commission
can then comment on the drafts, issue recommendations, or bring an
enforcement action if Community laws are being violated.' 7 3 Within the
basic standards currently in force, Member-states are "requested" to
make compulsory the reporting of activities which involve a hazard aris-
ing from ionizing radiation. 74 Thus, legally, the basic standards impose
no obligations on Member-states to provide notice of the transport of
radioactive materials.' 75 Moreover, Articles 30-33 (basic standards) do
standards rests with the Council (by a qualified majority vote) after consulting with the Com-
mission and the Assembly. The Scientific and Technical Committee is authorized under Arti-
cle 134.
168. Council Directive, art. 31, 1959 OJ. (L 20) 221. By virtue of Article 218, the basic
standards had to be established within one year of the Treaty's enactment. This Directive has
subsequently been amended under the terms of Article 32 (providing for amendment or revi-
sion of existing basic standards under procedure provided in Article 31) by Council Directive
80/836, art. 31, 1980 OJ. (L 246) 1, and by Council Directive 84/467, art. 31, 1984 OJ. (L
265) 4.
169. EURATOM TREATY art. 32.
170. Under this formulation, specific objectives are set, such as the assessment of maximum
permissible doses or levels of exposures, but the form and mode of implementation are left to
the national authorities. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
171. Under this Article the Commission is also authorized to issue recommendations
aimed at harmonization. EUTATOM TREATY art. 33. Yet, to impose these standards on the
Member-states in the form of directives risks more individualization which could have been
avoided through the use of regulations.
172. Id art. 33.
173. Id art. 141.
174. At present, there is a proposal for a Council Directive which would amend the present
standards to include a system of prior authorization for the shipment of radioactive waste. See
Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 80/836/Euratom Laying Down the Ba-
sic Safety Standards for the health protection of the General Public and Workers Against the
Dangers of Ionizing Radiation as Regards Prior Authorization of Shipment of Radioactive
Waste, 1990 O.J. (C210) 7.
175. When operating within Community law, "it is important to understand that the Com-
munity has no administrative substructure in the Member States. There are no Community
offices or agencies in the Member States which administer and apply Community law on a
national or local level." Grunwald, supra note 98, at 38; see also supra notes 119-21 and
accompanying text.
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not cover any physical means of protection. Rather, they only provide
objective standards which measure dose and exposure levels of radiation.
Still, in this way they do form a necessary baseline from which limited
Community enforcement action is activated.176
Tied to the "basic standards" are Articles 35 and 36 of the Treaty.
Article 35 requires that Member-states "establish the facilities necessary
to carry out continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air,
water and soil and to ensure compliance with the basic standards."' 7 7
The Community has a right to inspect these operations to verify their
efficiency. Pursuant to Article 36, Member-states are obligated to inform
the Commission on a regular basis as to the level of radioactivity to
which the public is exposed.17 Thus, these Articles work with Articles
30-33 (establishing basic standards) to provide a general basis by which
the Community can "objectively" monitor radioactivity levels in Mem-
ber-states.
It is presumed that the "basic standards" are applied to all sources
of radioactivity. Yet, some argue that a narrower interpretation is appli-
cable. Under this more restrictive construction, "basic standards" would
apply only to radiation generated from nuclear power industry
sources. 17 9 Such an interpretation is seemingly valid considering that the
overriding objective of Euratom is the development of a nuclear power
176. See EURATOM TREATY art. 38 (empowering the Community to issue directives neces-
sary to maintain basic standards in cases of urgency).
177. Article 35 states:
Each Member State shall establish the facilities necessary to carry out continu-
ous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil and to ensure
compliance with the basic standards.
The Commission shall have the right of access to such facilities; it may verify
their operation and efficiency.
Id. art. 35.
178. Article 36 states:
The appropriate authorities shall periodically communicate information on the
checks referred to in Article 35 to the Commission so that it is kept informed of the
level of radioactivity to which the public is exposed.
Id. art. 36.
179. This is the view taken by Professor W. Bleecker, who points out that the basic stan-
dards, which regulate the "maximum permissible dose for the whole population," are defined
by excluding "background radiation." Background radiation is defined as "all ionizing radia-
tions from terrestrial and cosmic natural sources." Yet, a logical response to this argument, as
noted by Professor Bleecker, is that the true Commission goal is to be informed as to the
general level of radioactivity which results from human-made activiti:s, but not as to radiation
from natural sources. W. Bleecker, Some Remarks on the Standardization of Measurements of
Radioactivity in Connection With the International Monitoring and Control of Radioactive Con-
tamination, in LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION IN TIlE PEACEFUL
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY 1181, 1182-83 (1960).
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industry. This view would preclude application of the "basic standards"
to non-nuclear power radioactive waste products. However, this narrow
interpretation is contrary to the plain language of these provisions. First,
Article 30 states that the purpose for establishing basic standards is to
protect the general public and workers "against the dangers arising from
ionizing radiations." No limitation is expressed as to the origin of "ion-
izing radiations," hence none should be inferred. Moreover, the ex-
pressed obligation of Articles 35 and 36 is to measure compliance with
the basic standards established under Article 30 and to require "continu-
ous monitoring of radioactivity in the air, water and soil." Like Article
30, no reference is made to the specific source of the radiation. Further,
the reference to radiation "in the air, water and soil" implicates a wider
range of radioactivity sources than just nuclear power sources. 180 It sim-
ply does not make sense to limit application of the standards according to
the source of the radiation, when the express purpose of this provision is
to protect "the general public arising from the dangers arising from" ra-
diation. Articles 30, 31, 32, 33 and Articles 35 and 36, should be recog-
nized as an attempt to establish basic minimum standards on a
Community level to protect the public from radiation, irrespective of its
origin.18 '
Article 34182 implicates a more specific concern: "particularly dan-
gerous experiments." This provision of Euratom requires that Member-
states undertake "additional health and safety measures" where such ex-
periments are being conducted. '83 More importantly, the assent of the
Commission is necessary where the "effects of such experiments are lia-
ble to affect the territories of other Member-states." Although opinions
are not binding, 84 paragraph two of Article 34 mandates the assent of
180. In addition, it might be argued that even if these provisions were to be limited to
nuclear power sources, radioactive waste is a necessary by-product of such industrial opera-
tions and is therefore implicated. Even so, this argument still leaves non-nuclear power radio-
active waste outside the reach of the basic standards.
181. Yet, imposing health and safety standards affects production costs. At least initially,
many Member-states were slow to incorporate such standards into their national legislation.
POLACH, supra note 108, at 94.
182. Article 34 states:
Any Member states in whose territories particularly dangerous experiments are
to take place shall take additional health and safety measures, on which it shall first
obtain the opinion of the Commission.
The assent of the Commission shall be required where the effects of such experi-
ments are liable to affect the territories of other Member States.
EURATOM TREATY art. 34.
183. Before imposing additional safety measures, the non-binding opinion of the Commis-
sion is required. lea
184. Id art. 161.
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the Commission where the effects of the experiment are liable to affect
the territories of other Member-states.
In a French administrative court case,18 5  the Commune de
Thionville, backed by a number of municipalities, asked for an annul-
ment of a French government decree authorizing the construction of the
Cattentom nuclear power station.1 86 One of the arguments advanced by
the plaintiffs was that the decree was void because the French Govern-
ment had failed to obtain the opinion of the European Commission as
obligated under Article 34 of Euratom. 187 In the plaintiffs' view, both
the projected magnitude of the Cattenom plant, which was labeled "ex-
ceptional," and the type of new technology employed in the venture
made the project "a particularly dangerous experiment," thus, requiring
the opinion of the Commission at the initial stage (i.e., at the declaration
d'utilite publique). The Conseil d'Etat rejected this argument, stating
that Article 34 did not apply to nuclear power stations such as Cattenom.
The basis for this holding was that nuclear reactors are not designed for
experimentation, but for the industrial production of electricity. 88
Although this finding is limited, it does illustrate the constrained
scope of Article 34. The application of additional health and safety
measures is limited to "particularly dangerous experiments." In addi-
tion, the approval of the Commission is only required where the effects of
such an experiment are "liable to affect" other Member-states. It ap-
pears, in the Community's view, that Article 34 is limited to those activi-
ties which can be labeled truly experimental and involving some
heightened degree of risk.189
185. Recueil des Decisions du Conseil d'Etat, 484 (1981).
186. The Cattenom plant is one of the largest nuclear power plants in the world. By 1995,
when its 4 reactors are due to be operational, it will produce over 5,200 MWe. It is located
10km from the France-Germany border and 12km from the France-Luxembourg border,
More significantly, the effluent waters of the plant are discharged into the Moselle River to-
ward Germany and Luxembourg. Koen Lenaerts, Nuclear Border Installations: A Case-Study,
13 EUR. L. REv. 159, 160 (1988).
187. According to the plaintiffs, this failure constituted an infringement of an essential
procedural requirement that should have resulted in the decree's annulment. Id. at 164,
188. Recueil des Decisions du Conseil d'Etat, supra note 185, at 484-85. Note that, rather
than refer the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary interpretation of Article 34,
which the Court of Justice would have been authorized to do under Article 150, the Conseil
d'Etat ruled on the matter itself. Since the French tribunal was interpreting Community law,
the validity of its precise interpretation of Article 34 must be questioned. Moreover, since the
Conseil d'Etat is a court in which there is no remedy of appeal under national law, there is a
strong argument that it is bound to refer all questions concerning the interpretation of E.C.
law to the Court of Justice. See EURATOM TREATY art. 150.
189. Article 34 has yet to receive full application by the E.C. institutions. Yet, even in the
situation over the Cattenom controversy, the European Parliament never contended that Arti-
[Vol. 16
Radioactive Waste and Euratom
The most direct application of Treaty authority to radioactive waste
is expressed in Article 37.1 ° Article 37 is the only provision within
Euratom which expressly addresses the disposal of radioactive waste.
Within this context, a Member-state has the obligation to seek the opin-
ion of the Commission regarding any plan for the disposal of radioactive
waste, in order to determine if it is liable to result in contamination of
another Member-state's territory. This obligation is qualified in two im-
portant respects. First, the Commission's power is limited to giving an
opinion, which is non-binding. Second, the investigation is only to deter-
mine if a plan is likely to result in the contamination of another Member-
state.
In a 1986 case, involving the Cattenom nuclear power plant,"' the
interpretation of Article 37 was directly at issue.19 The French govern-
ment had sent relevant information, as required under Article 37, to the
Commission before the discharge of radioactive waste had begun, but
after it had permitted operation of the plant. The precise legal issue
cle 34 applied. One author suggests that the European Parliament's failure to include the
application of Article 34 in its resolution of the matter represents a significant political expres-
sion that this provision should be construed narrowly. Lenaerts, supra note 186, at 173 n.82.
190. Article 37 states:
Each Member state shall provide the Commission with such general data relat-
ing to any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form as will make it
possible to determine whether the implementation of such plan is liable to result in
the radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member state.
The Commission shall deliver its opinion within six months, after consulting the
group of experts referred to in Article 3 1.
E-uRATOM TREATY art 37.
191. See supra note 186 for a general background of the Cattenom nuclear power plant.
192. The facts and procedural background of this case began in October 1978, when a
preliminary feasibility study or plan was filed with the French government, declaring Catte-
nom to be public utility work. On November 29, 1978, the Commission was supplied with, in
conformity with Article 41 of Euratom, information relating to the investment project for
Cattenom. Between 1979 and 1982, building permits were granted by French authorities for
the construction of Cattenom's 4 power blocks. On July 31, 1984, L'Electric' de France
[E.D.F.] asked French authorities for authorization to dispose of liquid and gaseous radioac-
tive effluent from each of the 4 blocks. On February 24, 1986, two orders were issued by the
ministers responsible, authorizing the disposal of the radioactive waste. On April 28, 1986,
proceedings were brought in the Administrative Court at Strasbourg challenging the validity
of those orders both under national law and under Article 37 of Euratom. The next day the
French government sent to the Commission "general data" about the radioactive waste dispo-
sal from Cattenom "in accordance with" Article 37. On October 22, 1986, the Commission
issued its opinion, which was in general terms favorable. The following day the Minister au-
thorized the Director General of E.D.F. to start the nuclear power generator in the first block
of Cattenom. By judgement dated June 11, 1987, the Strasbourg Administrative Court voided
the orders on national law grounds and stayed the remaining claims until the Court of Justice
had ruled on the interpretation of Article 37 of Euratom. Case 187/87, Saarland v. Minister of
Industry, 1988 E.C.R. 5013.
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before the Court of Justice was: Does Article 37 require the Commission
to be notified before the disposal of radioactive waste is authorized
(where a procedure for prior authorization is set in motion) or merely
before such disposal actually begins? The Court held that Article 37 re-
quires the Commission's opinion be obtained and considered before the
plan for disposal is authorized. It concluded that the purpose of Article
37 is to give the Commission a real opportunity to comment on the plans
submitted to it, as well as to avoid situations of urgency with risk to
neighboring Member-states. The Court stated that although France had
the right to depart from the Commission's opinion, that pursuant to its
obligations under Article 192193 of Euratom or its general obligations as
a Member of the Community, it had a "duty to give full and careful"
consideration to the Commission's opinion. The Court reasoned that in
order to be effective and comply with the intent of Article 37, it is essen-
tial that the Commission's opinion relating to such a plan be received in
advance of final authorization.
Moreover, the Court found that the purpose of Article 37 is to pre-
vent the possibility of radioactive contamination, whereas Article 38 ap-
plies where a risk of contamination is imminent or has already
occurred. 194 The Court recognized that Article 38 must remain an ex-
ceptional remedy and cannot absolve Member-states from fulfilling their
obligations under Article 37.195 The Court implied a duty of the Mem-
ber-states to give substantive consideration to the Commission's opinion
even though it is non-binding. Further, the Court broadly interpreted
the application of Article 37196 to include the licensing of a nuclear
193. A Member-state has the duty to "take all general or particular measures which are
appropriate for ensuring the carrying out of the obligations arising out of this treaty or result-
ing from the acts of the institutions of the Community." EURATOM TREATY art. 192.
194. In addition, the Court found that the value of the Commmission's opinion would be
diminished if it was given after a government's authorization of a project. This is because the
governmental authority authorizing such a project could become entrenched in its decision.
Also, since parties to whom approval would be granted would necessarily aquire legal rights,
the opportunity of interested parties to challenge approval would be limited, Saarland v. Min-
ister of Industry, supra note 192, at 5034.
195. The Commission has recently proposed a recommendation on the application of Arti-
cle 37 which defines the extent to which data must be given on a project. The recommendation
would require the Member-states to provide information on every conceivable aspect of a pro-
ject. It broadly covers any form of radioactive waste disposal, planned or accidental, and a
wide range of nuclear operations from mining or milling processing to any type of marine or
land disposal. More importantly, the recommendation would require that radioactive waste
disposal plans should be communicated "whenever possible one year but not less than six
months before any authorization for the disposal of radioactive waste is granted by competent
authorities." Commission Recommendation on the Application of Article 37 of the Euratom
Treaty, art. 37, 1990 O.J. (L 6) 16.
196. The Commission has recently given its opinion, under Article 37, approving the fol-
[Vol, 16
Radioactive Waste and Euratom
power plant, although it was not strictly "a plan for the disposal of radio-
active waste." 197 Article 37 can therefore be seen as possessing an antici-
patory quality as it is designed to control problems arising from
radioactive waste disposal in advance of their occurrence. Still, although
its application is broad and forward looking, an opinion is only advisory.
Thus ulitimately, its ability to affect control over disposal practices is
diluted by its inability to compel action. 198
Article 38199 empowers the Commission to act affirmatively in cases
of urgency to issue directives requiring the Member-state to take within a
specified time "all measures necessary to prevent infringement with the
basic standards and ensure compliance with regulations." 2" As pointed
out by the Court of Justice in the Cattenom case, this provision is in-
tended to cover cases where the risk of contamination is "imminent or
has already occurred. '20 1 In this regard, its application is complemen-
tary to Article 37, which is designed to prevent such urgencies.
The Court hinted at a potentially wider application when it stated,
"[I]f the Commission knows that disposal measures have been or are
lowing projects: Commission Opinion Concerning the Facility for Immediate Storage of Spent
Fuel in Ahaus (Federal Republic of Germany), art. 37, 1990 O.J. (L 105) 27; Commission
Opinion Concerning the Plan for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste From the DEMOX-PI
Fuel Fabrication Plant in Dessel (Belgium), art. 37, 1990 OJ. (L 337) 23; Commission Opin-
ion Concerning the Windscale Virification Plant and the Virified Product Store (United King-
dom), art. 37, 1990 O.. (L 193) 35.
197. The Court found the "disposal of waste [to be] an essential part of planning a nuclear
power station .... ." Saarland v. Minister of Industry, supra note 192, at 5034.
198. As noted by the Court, there is an element of control that is exerted by the Commu-
nity, in that Member-states are under an obligation as Community members to give real con-
sideration to the Community's opinion. Further, there may be an clement of informal control
of a political nature that comes with the issuance of a Community opinion. Yet, as a legal
matter final discretion rests with the Member-state. Id at 5041-5042.
199. Article 38 states:
The Commission shall make recommendations to the Member States with re-
gard to the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil.
In cases of urgency, the Commission shall issue a directive requiring the Mem-
ber State concerned to take, within a period laid down by the Commission, all neces-
sary measures to prevent infringement of the basic standards and to ensure
compliance with regulations.
Should the State in question fail to comply the Commission directive within the
period laid down, the Commission or any Member State concerned may forthwith,
by way of derogation from Articles 141 and 142, bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
EURATOM TREATY art. 38.
200. Id. If the Member-state does not comply with the directive within the time limits
specified, then the Commission may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice. It
may do so without allowing the Member-state the opportunity to voice its opinion and without
issuing an opinion itself, as provided by Article 141. Id
201. Saarland v. Minister of Industry, supra note 192, at 5033.
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about to be put into effect which infringe the basic standards or relevant
regulations, it could issue a directive under Article 38. ''2o2 This situation
could constitute "a case of urgency" within the meaning of Article 38.
Further, it can be implied from the plain language of the provision that a
case of urgency is implicated when an infringement of the basic standards
has or is anticipated to occur. This would suggest that Article 38 can be
utilized in advance of an actual infringement in order to prevent its oc-
currence. Yet, the Court also regarded Article 38 as a remedy whose
application is exceptional. In practice, Article 38 has not been used to its
full potential. For example, the Commission's attempts to coordinate a
Community response to the Chernobyl accident was surprisingly ineffec-
tive. The Community's poor response was partly caused by insufficient
authority and the existence of significant differences in the practices of
the Member-states. As a result, harmonization of the individual re-
sponses of Member-state was difficult. The Commission indicated that it
did not utilize Article 38 after the accident because of its inability to
access adequate data.2 °3 Therefore Article 38 appears to be a device
whose operation is reserved for emergency situations which pose immi-
nent danger to Member-states, and not for anticipatory issues of long-
term harm.
Article 3924 requires the Community to establish, within the frame-
work of the Joint Nuclear Research Center, a health and safety division.
The objective of this research division is to collect information and docu-
mentation of matters referred to in Articles 33, 36, and 37. It also serves
to aid the Commission in executing its health and safety responsibilities.
202. Id. at 5032-33.
203. See Grunwald, supra note 98, at 33-34 (describing the uncoordinated efforts of Mem-
ber-states reacting to the Chernobyl accident and the inaction of the E.C.); EURATOM The
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, supra note 102, at 230; see also
supra note 98. Currently, there is an obligation of notice on the part of Member-states for
"[a]ny accident involving the exposure of the population .... ." Article 45(5) of Council Direc-
tive 80/836, art. 30, 1980 O.J. (L 246) 14. Yet, in response to a Parliamentary question, the
Commission responded that Article 45(5) does not apply where the exposure to the population
is minimal. Answer of the Commission of March 5, 1987, to Written Question No. 345/86,
European Parliament, May 13, 1986, 1987 O.J. (C 143) 4.
204. Article 39 states:
The Commission shall set up within the framework of the Joint Nuclear Re-
search Centre, as soon as the latter has been established, a health and safety docu-
mentation and study section.
This section shall in particular have the task of collecting the documentation
and information referred to in Articles 33, 36 and 37, and of assisting the Commis-
sion in carrying out the tasks assigned to it by this Chapter.
EURATOM TREATY art. 39.
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B. EURATOM Chapter VII: Safeguards
Chapter VII establishes Euratom's core system of safeguards. While
the intent of these provisions is to insure that radioactive materials are
being used for valid purposes,205 they possess collateral implications for
control over radioactive waste. Article 772°6 obligates the Commission
to satisfy itself that radioactive materials are not diverted from their in-
tended and declared use. This obligation extends over all nuclear materi-
als which are in the territories of the Member-states or are supplied by
third party countries. This basic system of control is dependent upon
Member-state declaration of the true use of the materials. 07 Article 78
requires Commission approval for processes used in the production, sep-
aration, or processing of irradiated nuclear fuels. 20 8 As part of this Arti-
cle, Member-states are required to declare the basic technical
characteristics of such installations to the extent necessary to attain the
objectives set out under Article 77.
Article 79 requires the Member-states to maintain, for accounting
purposes, operating records of the production and transport of radioac-
tive fuels.' 9 The purpose of this provision is to enable the Commission
to establish a central account of all ores, source materials and special
fissile materials.210 To ensure that the aims of Article 77 are observed,
the Commission is vested with authority to send inspectors into Member-
states. The inspectors are officials of the Community and are given the
authority to verify the accuracy of the declarations made under Article
205. POLACH, supra note 108, at 95-96; see also H. W. Schleicher, Nuclear Safeguards in
the European Community-A RegionalApproach, 22 QJ. INT'L ATOM. ENERGY 45,45 (1980);
KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 157, at 336 ("[t]he controlling task with which the
Commission is entrusted in this context serves to ensure that [radioactive materials] are not
diverted from their intended uses as formulated by users, and to ensure the observance of
provisions of any agreement between the Community and third state or an international
organization.").
206. Article 77 states:
In accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, the Commission shall satisfy
itself that, in the territories of Member States,
(a) ores, source materials and special fissionable materials are not diverted
from their intended uses as declared by the users;
(b) the provisions relating to supply and any particular safeguarding obli-
gations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third
state or international organization are complied with.
EURATOM TREATY art. 77.
207. Id art. 60.
208. Id art. 78.
209. Id art. 79.
210. See Commission Regulation 3227/76, 1976 OJ. (L 363) 1 (setting forth the basic
regulations behind Articles 77, 78, and 79). This provision is not intended to regulate the
transport of radioactive materials.
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79. Further, they have broad access to all information located in any
Member-state. However, they are limited to the objectives established in
Article 77, namely ensuring that radioactive materials are not diverted
from authorized use.211 Should a Member-state be found in violation of
Article 79, the Commission is authorized to issue a directive compelling
the Member-state to comply within a limited time.212 The Commission
is also authorized in the event of an infringement, under Article 83, to
impose direct sanctions on the person(s) or enterprise(s) in violation.
The severity of the sanctions can vary from a warning to total with-
drawal of nuclear materials.213 The enforcement of the sanctions is the
responsibility of the Member-states.21 4 If the violating party is a Mem-
ber-state, the Commission must place the matter before the Court of Jus-
tice under Article 141.
Finally, Article 80 requires any excess special fissile material not
being utilized to be deposited with the Agency. 215 However, materials
deposited in this way are subject to return upon demand of the owner.21 6
Article 84 expressly exempts Chapter VI Safeguards from applying to
"materials intended to meet defence requirements. ' 217
C. The Adequacy of Radioactive Waste Regulation Under Euratom
The sufficiency of Euratom to properly regulate radioactive waste
must be considered in the context of the diverse interests of the Member-
states. As discussed in Parts II and III of this Note, ultimate control
over radioactive waste policy within the E.C. is directed by individual
Member-states. The effect of this system has been negative both to the
211. Article 81 requires that Member-states be consulted in advance of the inspections. In
addition, should the inspectors be refused access or if the matter must be dealt with quickly,
the Commission may order the Member-state to comply. EURATOM TREATY art. 81.
212. Id. art. 82.
213. In a recent enforcement action under Article 83, the Commission sanctioned Advance
Nuclear Fuels GmbH. A German fabrication plant operator was found to have violated
Euratom Regulations 3227/76 by failing to give advance notice of export, breaching regula-
tions on inventory changes, and breaching operating record regulations. According to Com-
mission findings, an employee of the plant had inadvertently loaded unlabeled radioactive
material onto a pallet which was subsequently exported. The German company was placed
under the administration of a Commission-appointed supervisor for a period of 4 months.
Commission Decision Relating to a Procedure in Application of Article 83 of the Euratom
Treaty, art. 83, 1990 O.J. (L 209) 27.
214. EURATOM TREATY art. 83(4). An accused party under this Article has a right to
appeal the Commission's action to the Court of Justice, which suspends the sanctions until
resolution. Id. art. 83(2).
215. Id. arts. 53-56.
216. Id. art. 80.
217. Id. art. 84.
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interests of Member-states and the E.C. as a whole.2"" Thus, in a general
way Euratom is flawed simply because it lacks the requisite authority to
bind Member-states to a unified Community radioactive waste policy.
As a threshold matter, even the purported Community ownership of
radioactive materials undermines its power to truly regulate such materi-
als. Although the Community possesses ownership rights in radioactive
substances (Article 86), which would appear to form a solid legal basis
for controlling these materials, this right is not absolute. First, Commu-
nity ownership does not apply to radioactive materials which are not cov-
ered by Chapter VII Safeguards. 219 Radioactive materials which are
subject to Chapter VII's provisions are limited to "ores, source materials
and special fissionable materials." By virtue of this limitation, it is un-
likely that radioactive waste materials would be deemed within its con-
trol.' ° Thus, the Community has no legal basis on which to claim an
ownership interest in such radioactive waste products. Even assuming
that the Community "ownership" right applied to radioactive waste
products, the Member-states possess broad vested rights to use and con-
sume such materials."2 As a result, the Member-states' right of use and
consumption significantly diminishes actual Community control over
such materials, even if "owned" by the Community.' m
Under Chapter III, Euratom regulation of radioactive waste is cur-
sory and ineffectual. The starting point is the provisions governing the
implementation and monitoring of the basic standards. There are two
areas where Member-states retain control over the Community's basic
standard program. First, since the basic standards are enacted in the
form of directives, Member-states retain discretion on how they are im-
plemented into national law.223 In addition, it is the principal responsi-
bility of the Member-states to monitor compliance with these
standards.' 4 To the extent that a Member-state's interests are not in
keeping with Community-wide regulation, they will diverge and under-
mine Community control in the area.
218. See supra notes 34-101 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 161. In addition, under Article 86, Community ownership extends
only to "special fissile materials." The term "special fissile materials" is defined in Article 197.
This excludes radioactive materials intended for defense purposes. Et7RATOM TREATY art. 84.
220. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
221. See EURATOM TREATY art. 87.
222. See supra note 159.
223. Regulation over the transport of radioactive materials, which has significant potential
for public risk, is not compulsory. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
224. The Commission is under an obligation to ensure that Member-states are fulfilling
their obligations under the Treaty. EURATOM TREATY art. 124. Yet, the actual task of sur-
veillance has to be carried out by the Member-states themselves. Id art. 35.
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Second, these standards regulate through exposure limits. Thus,
they do not come into operation until radioactivity has been released into
the environment.2 25 As a result, the standards cannot affect decisions
involving radioactive waste disposal which do not result in exposure to
"dangers arising from ionizing radiation. ' '226 The basic standards are an
appropriate way to establish a minimum baseline in order to gauge in-
fractions. However, they are too incomplete to anticipate and regulate
the regional implications of radioactive waste.
Article 34, dealing with particularly dangerous experiments, also
lacks effectiveness in regulating radioactive waste. As an initial matter,
this provision appears limited exclusively to experimental practices.227
Since the disposal of radioactive waste is an ongoing industrial activity, it
does not fit well within this limitation.228 In addition, direct Community
control over radioactive waste practices is the domain of Article 37. As
the Court of Justice has interpreted Article 37, it is unlikely that the
Court would extend this role to Article 34. Yet, Article 34 is attractive
because it essentially provides the Community a veto power over such
experiments to the extent that their "effects are liable to affect the territo-
ries of other Member States." Excluding the disposal of radioactive
waste from the requirements of Article 34 significantly diminishes Com-
munity control over these practices. This is evident from the limited
scope of Article 37.
Article 37 expressly addresses "plans for the disposal of radioactive
waste." It has been held to apply broadly to activities which are antici-
pated to produce radioactive waste.229 Yet, its principal requirement,
that the opinion of the Commission be sought prior to any authorization
for disposal of radioactive waste, does not legally bind Member-states.230
225. This may have some deterrent effect in terms of ensuring there is no exposure beyond
the limits set by a Member-state's basic standards.
226. The standard cannot affet, for example, decisions concerning how and where to dis-
pose of waste product. The true danger from radioactive waste involves the leakage of HLW
into the human environment. Yet, if a site is ineffective in containing waste and begins to leak,
these standards alone are too little too late.
227. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
228. This was the basic view of the Conseil d'Etat. See supra notcs 185-89 and accompany-
ing text. It could be argued that since one of the steps to full operation of a HLW repository Is
investigation of the proposed site for suitability, this type of activity should be covered by
Article 34, notwithstanding Article 37.
229. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
230. Even so, an opinion need only determine whether a plan is liable to result in contami-
nation of another Member-state's territory. Thus, where a plan is liable only to contaminate
the disposing state, the Community has no legal basis for further investigation. This is because
the sole aim of the Commission's opinion under Article 37 is to ascertain if a disposal plan is
liable to contaminate another Member-state. Moreover, since use of the word "liable" implies
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Member-states, therefore, remain independent to dispose of radioactive
waste products in the manner they see fit. While this provision does pro-
vide the Community as a whole with notice to those disposal practices, it
fails to coordinate and control them on a regional basis. More impor-
tantly, since Article 38 has been interpreted to be an exceptional remedy,
the burden of regulating radioactive waste in advance of any radioactive
contamination falls on Article 37. This leaves the task of radioactive
waste regulation, like many others within the Treaty, to the discretion of
the Member-states.
Article 38 provides the Community with direct authority to compel
action by the Member-states. However, as applied to regulating radioac-
tive waste, this authority is sharply limited. Article 38 has been con-
strued to apply in exceptional circumstances and not to anticipate long-
term problems. This provision has also been implicated where the basic
standards have been or are imminently expected to be exceeded.133 Arti-
cle 38, thus, represents the Community's mechanism for dealing with
radioactive emergencies but not for regulating radioactive waste products
on a regular basis.
Chapter VII creates a system of control which is directed at specific
types of nuclear fuels and source materials. There is little textual support
that radioactive waste products are subject to control by these Arti-
cles.2 32 The safeguards are limited to specific types of radioactive materi-
als which possess some commercial viability. The purpose of the
safeguards is to assure that these materials are not diverted from their
intended use. Note that most radioactive waste, per se, has no intended
use. 1 3 Yet, these provisions to give the Community a degree of author-
ity not found in any other provision of the Treaty. The Commission can
directly oversee the nuclear operations of Member-states through inspec-
tions (Article 81) and sanctions (Article 83). Also, the Community has
an element of immediacy or likelihood, application of Article 37 to many types of waste dispo-
sal practices may be precluded. With these types of disposal options, contamination is not
liable to occur for centuries. EURATOM TREATY art. 37.
231. However, in practice the Commission has been reluctant to utilize Article 38. See
supra note 203 and accompanying text; see also supra note 98; DeYoung, supra note 5, at Al.
One author suggests that Article 38 should be used where a Member-state ignores the Com-
mission's opinion under Article 37. So far this has not been the view of the Commission. See
Grunwald, supra note 98, at 44.
232. The references in Article 77 to "users" of "source materials" and "special fissionable
material" imply that these sections were intended to regulate the uses of such material.
233. It is true that some radioactive waste is used as a base material in reprocessing and
thus in this context may be subject to the safeguards. Yet, the principal concern with the vast
majority of radioactive waste is with substances which have no commercial use and that re-
quire disposal.
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approval power over nuclear fuel processing techniques, which utilize ra-
dioactive waste products as a source material (Article 78). However,
these powers are qualified and subject to Member-state compliance and
implementation. More significantly, the scope of these provisions is de-
fined by the objectives of Article 77, which appear more concerned with
ensuring valid and controlled use of nuclear materials than with the regu-
lation of their waste products. 234
V. SOME PROPOSALS TOWARD REFORM
The principal flaw in Euratom's treatment of radioactive waste
stems from its origin. Because the nature and scope of the radioactive
waste problem was not initially recognized, the Treaty was not endowed
with adequate force for its effective control. In general terms, the Treaty
allows Member-states too much leeway in directing radioactive waste
practices. The authority it does retain is not sufficient to compel Mem-
ber-state action to the degree necessary for coordination of regional radi-
oactive waste disposal. The failure to adopt regulations creating a unified
radioactive waste program has led to the wide range of negative disposal
practices seen among the individual Member-states. A unified system of
regulation would allow the E.C. as a whole to select the safest and most
cost effective waste disposal options. This system would enable the inter-
ests of all Community Members, both nuclear and non-nuclear states, to
be fully considered.
Any alternative to Euratom's present regulatory scheme will have to
include greater regulatory authority over Member-states. In this regard,
joint Community ownership should be expressly extended over all radio-
active waste products. This authority should require each Member-state
to keep extensive and detailed records of such materials. Further, this
requirement should include spot audits and empower the Commission to
impose direct sanctions for violations.
The basic standards provided in Articles 30-33 should be retained
with some modifications. As a procedural matter, the standards should
be enacted in the form of regulations, applying directly to Member-states
without national implementation. Moreover, the Community must have
the ability to monitor directly the compliance of Member-states with the
basic standards through the use of Community facilities. Currently the
Community is dependent upon the facilities of Member-states.
The existing provisions under Article 34 and 38, concerning danger-
ous experiments and cases of urgency, should also be retained, but Com-
234. See supra notes 205, 210-13, 216 and accompanying text.
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munity power to act under them should be expanded. Under Article 34
approval of the Commission should be required for any dangerous exper-
iment. The existing qualifications that the experiment be "particularly"
dangerous and that it be "liable to affect the territories of other Member-
states" is too limited. Under Article 38, the ability of the Community to
act should be broadened by adopting a wider interpretation of "cases of
urgency.
'235
The most substantive alteration required involves Article 37. The
Community should be required to approve all plans which have the ca-
pacity to produce radioactive waste material. This definition is broader
than simply a "plan for the disposal of radioactive waste" in that it looks
toward the activities producing the waste. Further, approval should be
required for any qualifying plan.236 Currently Article 37 only requires
the opinion of the Commission, which has no binding effect on the Mem-
ber-state disposal practices. By requiring Commission approval based
upon objective criteria, Community oversight which is both equitable
and binding can be achieved. Moreover, the basis for Commission disap-
proval should extend beyond whether a disposal plan is liable to result in
contamination of another Member-state. Rather, the approval process
should include recommendations and modifications to plans submitted.
The existing authority granted to the Community under Chapter
VII (Safeguards) should be extended to encompass all types of radioac-
tive materials, including waste products. This would enable the Commis-
sion to directly control through the use of such materials by employing
inspectors and sanctions.
As a final modification, the Community should create a single
agency with responsibility over all Treaty matters concerning health and
safety, security and environmental impacts.237 This agency would have
complete authority to approve Commission authorizations under Article
37. The agency would also be responsible for monitoring compliance
with Articles 30-33 and overseeing Community ownership of radioactive
waste materials.
The proposed changes go beyond any authorized amendment proce-
dure contained within Euratom. As such, these modifications would
235. "Cases of urgency" should be defined expressly so that Community authority under
this provision is unambiguous.
236. To limit this approval to plans which are "liable to result in the contamination of
another Member state's territory," as the current Treaty does, ignores the long term risks
associated with the disposal of radioactive waste. See supra note 230.
237. Recently the European Parliament proposed that the E.C. establish an independent
agency to regulate nuclear power plants. See Europarliament Seeks Independent EC Nuclear
Agency, REUTERS, July 9, 1992, at 1 (Energy News).
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have to be enacted pursuant to Article 203.238 Article 203 is essentially
the "necessary and proper" clause of the Treaty, which offers the Com-
munity a supplementary means of action. A Community cannot increase
its existing powers, but can only exercise those which it has implicitly or
explicitly been authorized to exercise under the Treaty. Euratom's abil-
ity to assume additional reach under Article 203 is defined by the nature
and scope of the Treaty's objectives and its existing provisions. Thus, the
issue becomes: Are the proposed measures (affecting the health, safety
and the environmental implications of radioactive waste) a part of, im-
plicitly or explicitly, the basic objectives of Euratom? It could be argued
that Euratom is exclusively concerned with the creation of a nuclear in-
dustry and thus is only granted authority by Member-states over com-
mercial nuclear matters. However, this interpretation is too narrow
given that the necessity of expanded regulation is the very result of the
commercial activities which Euratom has promoted. In this sense,
health, safety, and environmental concerns are an integral part of the
development of the E.C. nuclear industry. Moreover, the requirement of
Council unanimity under Article 203 is a strong guarantee against an
over-expansive reading of Community objectives.
The expansive reach of this provision is illustrated by its use within
the context of the E.E.C. Treaty.239 In 1985, the Council adopted the so-
called "Environmental Impact Directive" pursuant to Articles 100240
and 235241 of the E.E.C. Treaty. The directive obligates Member-states
238. Article 203 states:
If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve one of the aims of
the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers
of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the
Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate
provisions.
EURATOM TREATY art. 203.
239. Article 203 of Euratom is identical to Article 235 of the E.E.C. Treaty.
240. Article 100 of the E.E.C. Treaty authorizes the Council "acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission, [to] issue directives for the approximation of such provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affects the
establishment or functioning of the common market." E.E.C. TREATY art. 100.
241. Prior to the enactment of the S.E.A., it had been held that E.E.C. environmental
measures had to be taken on the basis of Articles 100 or 235, which require unanimity within
the Council. The adoption of the S.E.A. has not altered the legislative process applicable to
Community action in the field of environmental matters, except when such action is taken in
the framework of the achievement of the internal market (the aim of the S.E.A.). The S,E.A,
basically makes it easier to enact environmental legislation within that context. Dirk
Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European Eco-
nomic Community, 12 EUR. L. REV. 407, 425 (1987). Thus, since the S.E.A. did not alter
Euratom in this manner, the adoption of such legislation under Article 203 of Euratom should
be the same as under Article 235 of E.E.C.
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to consult each other when a project is likely to have significant effects on
the environment.242 Its scope is broad; it applies to both public and pri-
vate projects likely to have any significant effects on the environment.
Despite being adopted under the E.E.C. Treaty, it applies expressly to
nuclear power stations, nuclear reactors, reprocessors of radioactive
waste, and installations designed for the permanent storage or final dis-
posal of radioactive waste.243 Thus, while action under Article 235 of the
E.E.C. Treaty (like Article 203 of Euratom) is limited by the objectives of
the E.E.C., those objectives were defined broadly enough to permit the
adoption of the "Environmental Impact Directive." The principal objec-
tives of the E.E.C. Treaty are economic and commercial, yet an environ-
mental directive was adopted via Article 235. The adoption of E.E.C.
Directive 85/337 strongly suggests that the objectives of the Treaty are
to be given liberal construction when determining the reach of Article
235.2 4 Similarly, the objectives of Euratom should be given equal defer-
ence when determining the validity of action under Article 203. Given
the relation of the suggested modifications to the objectives of Euratom,
it is evident that Article 203 provides a valid legal basis for their
adoption.
VI. CONCLUSION
From its inception, Euratom's paramount concern has been to effec-
tuate the creation and development of a nuclear energy industry within
the E.C.245 It was envisioned that nuclear power, as a relatively new
source of cheap, efficient, and clean energy, would assure Europeans of
an independent energy source for the future. From an international per-
spective, the objective of Euratom was to enhance Europe's technological
standing with the rest of the world. The principal focus of the Treaty is
242. Council Directive 85/337, arts. 100, 235, 1985 OJ. (L 175) 40.
243. Id at 44-47 (Annex II).
244. Note that as a collateral matter, the substantive extent of the F-F..C. Directive goes far
beyond the reach of Article 37 of Euratom, which applies only where "a plan for the disposal
of radioactive waste" is at issue. In contrast, the F-F-C. Directive applies to all environmental
effects on all projects both public and private. Yet, this Directive does not alter the basic
deficiency of E.C. regulation over radioactive waste. Indeed, the consultative procedure man-
dated by the Directive runs only between Member-states and does not directly involve the
Community. The Community has no say in the location, operation, or construction of projects
under this Directive. Article 7 of the Directive states that "such information shall serve as a
basis for any consultations between two Member States on a reciprocal and equivalent basis."
Council Directive 85/337, arts. 100, 235, 1985 OJ. (L 175) 40, 42 (art. 7). In addition, the
Directive exempts projects serving national defense purposes and projects adopted by a specific
act of national legislation.
245. See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
1993]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
commercial. Most of Euratom's authority concerns matters relating to
the equal distribution of nuclear supplies, the rapid and unimpeded ac-
quisition of technical information relating to nuclear advancement, and
the creation of a single common market in nuclear power.246 In promot-
ing this goal the Treaty has been successful.
At the time of its enactment Euratom did not anticipate the enor-
mous problem of radioactive waste. There was a lack of understanding
as to the extreme toxic qualities of such waste and it was also not realized
that disposal of the waste byproducts of a nuclear industry would prove
so difficult.247 Given such a genesis, it is not surprising that regulation of
radioactive waste received inadequate attention.248 Thus, with its focus
on creating and promoting a nuclear industry, Euratom left principal
control over radioactive waste to Member-states.249
While the independence of Member-states is not in itself negative, it
has resulted in two fundamental problems with E.C. radioactive waste
policy. First, it has failed to produce a balanced commitment to nuclear
energy among Member-states. The Community's nuclear energy pro-
gram is represented by a wide cross-section of nuclear policies, with some
Member-states possessing extensive nuclear energy industries while
others possess none. Second, the fact that Member-states' nuclear energy
programs exist in an environment of independence, has operated to bring
about many of the waste disposal problems encountered by the E.C.
Such problems include the direct contamination of Member-states' and
third party countries' environments, the inability to adequately monitor
the transport of radioactive waste within the E.C., the lack of a sufficient
response system for radioactive emergencies, and the failure to anticipate
and plan fdr increasing amounts of radioactive waste.250 Thus, while the
246. See EURATOM TREATY art. 1; see also supra notes 139-65 and accompanying text.
247. The disposal of radioactive waste poses at least two functional problems. First, dispo-
sal of radioactive waste is dependent upon the physical environment of a given disposal site. It
is clear that not all sites are suitable for radioactive waste disposal. Thus, some Member-statcs
may not have a suitable disposal site on their territory. Second, any disposal site will require
large capital investment and extensive planning and testing. To undertake this requirement,
even assuming a suitable site is available, represents a significant financial and technological
burden for a Member-state. Not all Member-states may be capable of bearing such a burden.
See generally supra notes 10-33 and accompanying text.
248. Eur. Parl. Resolution on the Findings of the Committee of Inquiry on the Handling
and Transport of Nuclear Material, 1988 O.J. (C 235) 70 ("during the past 30 years of rapid
development in the nuclear energy industry, safety aspects such as nuclear waste disposal...
have been given low priority .... [Tihe objectives and form of the Euratom Treaty are no
longer equal to the need for protection against the transfrontier hazards and risks posed by the
use of nuclear energy . . ").
249. See supra notes 166-234 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 46-101 and accompanying text.
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Community encourages increasing use of nuclear energy, the regulation
of radioactive waste is essentially ad hoc with Member-states each pursu-
ing its own disposal policy.
Euratom does provide some regulatory oversight, but its effective-
ness is diminished for two reasons. First, it vests principal control over
radioactive waste policy with individual Member-states. Second, where
Euratom does possess authority, it fails to address the specific problem of
radioactive waste in a comprehensive manner. This system fails to ade-
quately protect the interests of both the Community at large and the
individual Member-states. Any solution to the radioactive waste prob-
lem facing the E.C. must begin by shifting control over radioactive waste
policy from the Member-states to a more centralized body. This would
be best accomplished by reforming Euratom's existing framework to pro-
vide for more effective oversight.
Generally, this Note suggests vesting increased authority in
Euratom to direct and regulate radioactive waste. Correspondingly,
Member-states would be required to relinquish power over radioactive
waste disposal matters. More specifically, it is urged that the Treaty be
amended to provided the Community with binding control over the dis-
posal of radioactive waste by enhancing Articles 34, 37 and 38 of the
Treaty. This Note also recommends the formation of a single Commu-
nity agency with specific authority to manage, administer, and enforce
Treaty obligations.
Since the proposed changes extend beyond any authorized amend-
ment procedure within Euratom, their adoption should be through the
Treaty's "necessary and proper clause," Article 203. Prior application of
an identical provision within the E.E.C. Treaty indicates that such action
under Article 203 has a valid legal basis.
Identifying a legal basis for solving the problem of radioactive waste
disposal is only the start towards a permanent solution. The remaining
barrier to change is not legal but political. Ultimately, to substantively
alter the existing treatment of radioactive waste disposal in the E.C., the
Community and each of its Member-states will need the common polit-
ical desire to reallocate power. If E.C. Member-states can accomplish
this goal, they may serve as a model for other countries in need of similar
extraterritorial regulation.
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